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LENDERS’ ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES 
IN SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKETS 
Susan Block-Lieb* 
W. Mark C. Weidemaier** 
 
Academic and policy debates about the multi-trillion-dollar sovereign 
debt markets presume these markets are unique. The reason is that sover-
eigns differ from other borrowers. To the extent observers look elsewhere 
for guidance, they turn to corporate debt as a comparison. For example, 
official actors have repeatedly intervened in sovereign debt markets by 
prodding market participants to draft loan contracts that simulate aspects 
of corporate bankruptcy. We argue that the conventional view of sovereign 
debt—though useful to a point—has substantially and unjustifiably limited 
the academic and policy agenda. Rather than dwell on the unique charac-
teristics of sovereign borrowers, we examine the practices and incentives 
of sovereign lenders. We show that, when viewed through this lender-fo-
cused prism, sovereign debt has as much or more in common with consumer 
than with corporate debt. Using consumer debt as a metaphor, we reveal 
gaps in the debate over how to reform sovereign debt markets. First, as-
sessments of the sustainability of sovereign debt presently—and unjustifi-
ably—overlook the negative consequences of excessive debt for the bor-
rower’s citizens. Second, reform initiatives designed to promote 
“responsible lending” lack clearly articulated goals, an omission that will 
impair the development of a coherent reform agenda. While not a perfect 
metaphor, experience with consumer lending and financial regulation can 
help fill these gaps in our understanding of sovereign lending, producing a 
clearer vision of the roles and responsibilities of lenders in sovereign debt 
markets. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Governments around the world are tens of trillions of dollars in debt.1 Not 
all of this will be repaid.2 When it occurs, government debt default can prompt 
wider financial crisis, as with Greece in 2010,  and will in any event be the prox-
imate cause of much human suffering.3 In Venezuela, the government labors to 
 
 1. See MCKINSEY GLOBAL INSTITUTE: DEBT AND (NOT MUCH) DELEVERAGING 1, 15, 20 (Feb. 2015) 
(reporting $58 trillion in government debt in mid-2014, including debt of state and local governments but not 
state-owned enterprises). 
 2.  On the recurring history of financial crisis and debt default, see CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. 
ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTURIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 10–12 (Princeton Univ. Press ed., 
2009). 
 3. See Dan Bilefsky & Landon Thomas Jr., Greece Takes its Bailout, but Doubts for the Region Persist, 
N.Y. TIMES (May 2, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/business/global/03drachma.html. 
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repay external bond creditors while the Venezuelan people lack basic goods and 
services like food, water, and electricity.4 A similar story continues to unfold  
in Puerto Rico, where a crisis prompted by the government’s belated acknowl-
edgement of its unsustainable debt burden was amplified by hurricane-related 
devastation.5 
The problem of unsustainable sovereign debt to date has mostly been 
viewed as a restructuring problem and, to be sure, sovereign debt restructuring  
is uniquely difficult. One reason derives from the law of sovereign immunity, 
which leaves creditors with relatively ineffective legal remedies if a sovereign 
borrower does not repay.6 Another reason is that sovereigns cannot file for  
bankruptcy.7 
These attributes of sovereign debt—weak legal enforcement and the lack 
of bankruptcy—have substantially defined and substantially limited the agenda 
for scholars and policy actors. For instance, the central puzzle addressed by the 
academic literature is why lenders without effective collection remedies make 
loans at all.8 Policy actors have repeatedly intervened in the bond markets to 
promote mechanisms for improving creditor coordination in response to a sov-
ereign’s default or restructuring proposal,  while relegating to the periphery the 
task of understanding and improving upon initial decisions to lend.9 These tradi-
tional approaches reflect the view that the problems of sovereign borrowing and 
 
 4.  See Allan Dodds Frank, Who Gets Venezuela’s Oil?, CNN (May 16, 2019), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2019/05/16/americas/venezuela-oil-debt-opinion-intl/index.html; Jeff Jacoby, Venezuelan Bonds are a Fabulous 
Investment, if You Don’t Mind the Starvation, BOS. GLOBE (June 23, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/opin-
ion/2017/06/23/venezuelan-bonds-are-fabulous-investment-you-don-mind-starvation/qplQj6i5Rq2JXSXJgrG 
WHO/story.html. A corrupt, dictatorial regime has magnified the hardship in Venezuela, paying bond debt for 
years while citizens went hungry. Id. Eventually, the government was forced to default on virtually all of its debt. 
Ben Bartenstein, Venezuela’s Lone Undefaulted Bond is Set for Guiado Lifeline, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 24, 2019), 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-04-24/venezuela-s-only-bond-not-in-default-set-to-get-guaido-
lifeline. 
 5.  See Rachel Frazin, Judge Approves Debt Restructuring Plan for Puerto Rico, THE HILL (Feb. 5, 2019), 
https://thehill.com/latino/428552-judge-approves-debt-restructuring-plan-for-puerto-rico; Lauren Lluveras, 
Puerto Rico’s Bankruptcy Will Make Hurricane Recovery Even Harder, WASH. POST (Sept. 27, 2017), https:// 
www.washingtonpost.com/news/posteverything/wp/2017/09/27/puerto-ricos-bankruptcy-will-make-hurricane-
recovery-even-harder/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.a147d2d9d105. In 2016, Congress passed legislation creating 
a bankruptcy process for Puerto Rico. Because in this Article we focus on “true” sovereigns, defined under in-
ternational law as entities with deﬁned territory and permanent population, self-governance, and the capacity to 
engage in formal relations with similar entities, see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF 
THE UNITED STATES § 201 (AM. LAW INST. 1987), we mostly leave the issues of Puerto Rico’s unsustainable debt 
to one side. 
 6.  See Mark Aguiar & Manuel Amador, Sovereign Debt, in 4 HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMICS 
647, 647 (2014); Ugo Panizza et al., The Economics and Law of Sovereign Debt and Default, 47 J. ECON. LIT. 1, 
2–3 (2009); W. Mark C. Weidemaier & Mitu Gulati, The Relevance of Law to Sovereign Debt, 31 ANN. REV. L. 
& SOC. SCI. 395, 396–401 (2015). 
 7.  See Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 6, at 396–402. 
 8.  For classic examples, see Jeremy Bulow & Kenneth Rogoff, A Constant Recontracting Model of Sov-
ereign Debt, 97 J. POL. ECON. 155, 156–57 (1989); Jonathan Eaton & Mark Gersovitz, Debt with Potential Re-
pudiation: Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, 48 REV. ECON. STUD. 289, 289 (1981). 
 9.  See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Mitu Gulati & Anna Gelpern, When Governments Write Contracts: Pol-
icy and Expertise in Sovereign Debt Markets, in CONTRACTUAL KNOWLEDGE: ONE HUNDRED YEARS OF LEGAL 
EXPERIMENTATION IN GLOBAL MARKETS 92, 92 (Grégoire Mallard & Jérôme Sgard eds., Cambridge Univ. Press 
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restructuring are sui generis, uniquely shaped by the fact of borrower sover-
eignty.10 When observers do try to draw insight from other kinds of debt, they 
generally look to corporate debt, in particular to corporate restructuring.11 
In this Article, we seek to reorient academic and policy discourse away 
from problems of restructuring and toward problems of lending. Sovereigns dif-
fer from other borrowers, to be sure, but the banks and financial intermediaries 
that sovereigns borrow from play relatively traditional roles as lenders.12 In most 
lending markets, the role of lending institutions is a key topic of debate, including 
debate over how to best regulate these entities. In the sovereign debt markets, 
that debate has been muted. 
The failure to consider lending-focused regulatory strategies is puzzling, 
but this gap in the discourse is slowly narrowing. Recent reform initiatives, 
launched by civil society groups and intergovernmental organizations with an 
interest in sovereign debt markets, have emphasized the need to promote respon-
sible lending.13 These initiatives, however, embrace an elastic definition of 
“lender responsibility” that encompasses a wide range of problematic behavior 
associated with making and enforcing sovereign loans.14 As a rhetorical matter, 
this definitional opacity might be necessary to prompt across-the-board consid-
eration of how to improve lending practices. But opacity also makes it hard to 
translate textual cues into policy action. 
Part I lays the groundwork for a more extensive discussion of lenders’ roles 
and responsibilities in sovereign debt markets, but we resist the usual comparison 
to corporate debt and restructuring. We look elsewhere for insight, to the market 
for consumer debt. It may seem odd to compare governments—which often con-
duct borrowing through professional finance ministries advised by expensive 
lawyers and financial advisors—to consumer borrowers. But to focus on the 
characteristics of the borrower is to miss the point, for there are important paral-
lels between sovereign and consumer debt.15 In both markets for “noncorporate” 
debt, lenders decide whether to lend, and whether to grant debt relief, based pri-
marily on an assessment of the borrower’s ability and willingness to pay, rather 
than on a valuation of the borrower’s assets.16 Moreover, both markets feature 
 
2016); Anna Gelpern & Mitu Gulati, Public Symbol in Private Contract: A Case Study, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 
1627, 1640 (2006). 
 10. Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 6, at 400. 
 11.  See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Restructuring Sovereign Debt, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 75, 91–92 (2003); 
Panizza et al., supra note 6, at 2–9; Patrick Bolton, Toward a Statutory Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructur-
ing: Lessons from Corporate Bankruptcy Practice Around the World (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper No. 
03/13, 2003); Eduardo Borensztein et al., Sovereign Debt Structure for Crisis Prevention 3–5, 11–13 (Int’l Mon-
etary Fund, Working Paper No. 237, 2004). 
 12.  We use the term broadly to encompass not only commercial banks but also the financial institutions 
that manage and underwrite sovereign bonds. 
 13.  See infra Subsection V.C.2 (discussing responsible lending initiatives). 
 14. BODO ELLMERS & KONSTANTINOS TODOULOS, THE UNCTAD PRINCIPLES ON PROMOTING 
RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING 1 (2013). 
 15.  Susan Block-Lieb, Austerity, Debt Overhang, and the Design of International Standards on Sovereign, 
Corporate, and Consumer Debt Restructuring, 22 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 487, 540 (2015). 
 16. Id. at 528, 539. 
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potent incentives for over-borrowing and for excessive, occasionally abusive, 
lending.17 If the global financial system is “rife with moral hazards, perverse in-
centives, and unintended consequences,” these deficiencies are readily apparent 
in both markets.18 The concept of “responsible lending” originated in regulation 
of residential mortgage, credit card credit, and similar consumer lending trans-
actions.19 Experience in these contexts can help clarify the goals and potential 
content of responsible sovereign lending edicts. 
Part II identifies incentives that induce lenders to extend vast amounts of 
credit to sovereign borrowers, sometimes with scant consideration for the risk of 
default. It also describes the responsible sovereign lending proposals recently put 
forward by United Nations Conference on Trade and Development 
(“UNCTAD”), Eurodad, and other civil society groups. Paralleling this discus-
sion, Part III next identifies comparable lender incentives in consumer debt mar-
kets and describes an emerging global convergence on consumer finance regula-
tions that looks to promote responsible lending. Although there are no precise 
internationally recognized standards on responsible consumer lending,20 there is 
broad agreement that regulation should govern consumers’ financial decisions 
and some convergence on what responsible lending should entail.21 
The comparison, while unconventional, has payoffs. Part IV closes by iden-
tifying examples of consumer financial regulation that might—depending on 
how responsible lending is conceptualized in connection with loans to sover-
eigns—be translated into the sovereign context. Our aim is to prompt more con-
crete discussion about how to define responsible lending and how to moderate 
incentives toward imprudent (or abusive) lending. We do not envision a radical 
transformation, especially as soft international standards on responsible lending 
would need to be translated into something both coordinated and subject to en-
forcement across global markets. Nevertheless, consumer debt offers an im-
portant, alternative lens through which to examine the problems of sovereign 
debt. Among other benefits, experience with consumer financial protection reg-
ulation highlights the importance of developing concrete substantive standards 
of lender responsibility and hints at how these substantive standards might look. 
 
 17. Id. at 541. 
 18. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, SIFIs and States, 49 TEX. INT’L L.J. 329, 330 (2014). 
 19. See, e.g., THE WORLD BANK, RESPONSIBLE LENDING: OVERVIEW OF REGULATORY TOOLS 4 (2013) 
[hereinafter RESPONSIBLE LENDING]. 
 20.  G20 High-Level Principles on Financial Consumer Protection, OECD (Oct. 2011), https://www.oecd. 
org/g20/topics/financial-sector-reform/48892010.pdf [hereinafter G20 HLP on FCP]. 
 21.  Through its International Financial Corporation, the World Bank has promoted its “Global Responsible 
Finance Program” since 2009. See WORLD BANK GROUP, GLOBAL MAPPING OF FINANCIAL CONSUMER 
PROTECTION & FINANCIAL LITERACY INITIATIVES 3 (2015), http://responsiblefinance.worldbank.org/~/media/ 
GIAWB/FL/Documents/Publications/Global-CPFL-Mapping-2015-FINAL.pdf; see also THE WORLD BANK, 
GLOBAL SURVEY ON CONSUMER PROTECTION AND FINANCIAL LITERACY: OVERSIGHT FRAMEWORKS AND 
PRACTICES IN 114 ECONOMIES 24 (2014), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/775401468171251449/ 
pdf/887730WP0v20P10port0CPFL0Box385258B.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL SURVEY]; THE WORLD BANK, GOOD 
PRACTICES FOR FINANCIAL CONSUMER PROTECTION 3 (2012), http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/583 
191468246041829/pdf/701570WP0P12260REWRITE0THE0ABSTRACT.pdf [hereinafter GOOD PRACTICES]; 
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 19, at 13. 
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II. BUILDING A BETTER METAPHOR 
The corporate debt metaphor has been instrumental both as an analytical 
tool and as a rhetorical device in academic and policy discourse about sovereign 
debt. It has been central to literature reviews,22 classic academic treatments,23 
and major policy proposals.24 In the sovereign debt restructuring context, for ex-
ample, there has been recurring debate over the need for a treaty-based interna-
tional restructuring tribunal.25 Proponents of such a tribunal have justified their 
position by invoking corporate restructuring as a model, as have their opponents 
(who favor the use of loan contracts designed to simulate certain features of cor-
porate bankruptcy).26 
Despite its utility, however, the corporate debt metaphor encourages an un-
duly narrow conception of both problems and regulatory possibilities in sover-
eign debt markets. Indeed, sovereign debt has as much or more in common with 
consumer as with corporate debt.27 There are at least two important parallels. 
First, while corporate lending is typically asset-based, lenders to both sovereign 
and consumer borrowers instead act based on assessments of ability and willing-
ness to repay. Second, both sovereign and consumer debt markets create similar 
incentives for excessive and abusive borrowing and lending. 
With regard to the first point, legal enforcement entails, with limited ex-
ceptions, only the right of a judgment holder to proceed against assets of a cor-
porate debtor.28 The limits of corporate form are well understood and rest im-
portantly on the defining feature of corporate structure—that is, the notion that 
shareholders’ ownership interests in a limited liability structure are explicitly in-
tended to partition corporate assets from owners’ assets. Indeed, it is because of 
this unique attribute of corporate form that many observers distinguish sovereign 
from corporate debtors.29 The former can keep assets safe within their borders; 
 
 22.  See, e.g., Panizza et al., supra note 6, at 2–9. 
 23.  See, e.g., Eichengreen, supra note 11, at 91–92; Bolton, supra note 11, at 880. 
 24.  See, e.g., Anne O. Krueger, IMF, A New Approach to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, at 11 (Apr. 2002) 
(discussing a treaty-based Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism modeled substantially on corporate reor-
ganization, but acknowledging differences between sovereign and corporate borrowers). 
 25. See IMF, Report of the Working Group on International Financial Crises at 45 (Oct. 1998), http:// 
www.bis.org/publ/othp01d.pdf. 
 26.  See id. at 19 (recommending inclusion of collective action clauses in sovereign bonds, with corporate 
insolvency as a model); Krueger, supra note 24, at 10–12 (discussing aspects of corporate insolvency relevant to 
SDRM); CHRISTOPH G. PAULUS, ED., A DEBT RESTRUCTURING MECHANISM FOR SOVEREIGNS: DO WE NEED A 
LEGAL PROCEDURE?, at Preface (2014) (with a series of essay-chapters, asking whether “a procedure (however 
close or however distant)” to insolvency law could “be a solution to the future sovereigns’ debt crises”); NOURIEL 
ROUBINI & BRAD SETSER, IMPROVING THE SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING PROCESS: PROBLEMS IN 
RESTRUCTURING, PROPOSED SOLUTION, AND A ROADMAP FOR REFORM 7 (2003) (comparing corporate bank-
ruptcy and sovereign debt restructuring, and evaluating proposed reforms); Patrick Bolton & Olivier Jeanne, 
Structuring and Restructuring Sovereign Debt: The Role of Seniority, 76 REV. ECON. STUD. 879, 880–82 (2009) 
(lamenting lack of enforceable priority rules in sovereign lending); Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restruc-
turing: A Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 958 (2000) (using corporate bank-
ruptcy as a model for sovereign debt restructuring). 
 27.  Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 492–93. 
 28.  Henry Hansmann et al., Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1337 (2006). 
 29.  See, e.g., Panizza et al., supra note 6, at 2–3. 
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the latter cannot (so easily) engage in judgment-proofing strategies.30 This dis-
tinction is real, although its significance should not be overstated.31 But the dis-
tinction does not merely distinguish sovereign from corporate debt. It also high-
lights an important similarity of sovereign to consumer debt. 
In the corporate context, a creditor’s power to seize assets is partitioned—
limited to assets of the corporation. Because courts almost always respect the 
corporate form, shareholders enjoy “entity protections.”32 The corporation’s 
creditors cannot force the sale of assets owned by shareholders or by other enti-
ties.33 The result is that, from the perspective of a creditor’s remedies on default, 
all corporate lending, whether secured or unsecured, is asset-based. 
By contrast, neither consumer nor sovereign lending is asset-based in this 
manner for somewhat different reasons. In the consumer context, lenders can 
force a sale of borrower assets after a default, but these often have little value. 
Thus, consumer lenders, such as credit card issuers, extend credit primarily based 
on assessments of the borrower’s income and willingness and ability to repay. 
Even consumer lending tied to valuable assets, such as a residential mortgage 
agreement in which the borrower grants a lien against his or her home to secure 
repayment, may not be constrained by the value of the asset in question. If the 
proceeds of foreclosure and forced sale are insufficient to repay the debt in full, 
the mortgage lender generally can garnish the borrower’s wages to cover the de-
ficiency.34 Here, too, the result is that residential mortgage lenders extend credit 
based only partly on the value of the home that secures the debt.35 All consumer 
lenders focus mostly on the borrower’s ability to repay. 
 
 30.  Corporate debtors can engage in judgment-proofing strategies with respect to many creditors. See Lynn 
M. LoPucki, The Death of Liability, 106 YALE L.J. 1, 5, 14–32 (1996). But corporate debtors, unlike sovereign 
debtors, can readily create enforceable security interests; many also have easily-identified owners who can guar-
antee corporate debts. Contract creditors can therefore protect their interests when dealing with corporate debtors. 
Id. at 7. 
 31.  See Stephen Kim Park & Tim R. Samples, Towards Sovereign Equity, 21 STAN. J.L., BUS. & FIN. 240, 
247–54 (2016); Weidemaier & Gulati, supra note 6, at 400–01. Recent scholarship documents an increase in 
litigation against foreign governments. See Julian Schumacher et al., What Explains Sovereign Debt Litigation?, 
58 J. LAW & ECON. 585, 585–86 (2015). Though many view this development skeptically, see, e.g., Rodrigo 
Olivares-Caminal, The Pari Passu Clause in Sovereign Debt Instruments: Developments in Recent Litigation, in 
SOVEREIGN RISK: A WORLD WITHOUT RISK-FREE ASSETS 121, 126 (Bank for International Settlements 2013), 
some ask whether potent legal enforcement might improve the functioning of debt markets. See Jill E. Fisch & 
Caroline M. Gentile, Vultures or Vanguards: The Role of Litigation in Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY 
L.J. 1043, 1044 (2004); Veronica Santarosa & Benjamin Chabot, Don’t Cry for Argentina (or Other Sovereign 
Borrowers): Lessons from a Previous Era of Sovereign Debt Contract Enforcement, 12 CAP. MKTS. L.J. 9, 11, 
29 (2017). 
 32. See Hansmann et al., supra note 28, at 1348. 
 33.  Id. at 1338. 
 34.  Because the law governing foreclosure is non-uniform state law, there are many exceptions. California, 
for example, is a “non-deficiency state,” which means that generally residential mortgage foreclosure ends col-
lection on the basis of such default. See, e.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 580b(a)(3) (2015). 
 35. Indeed, “asset-based lending,” premised on the notion that a consumer borrower’s income level and 
ability to repay is irrelevant to the lender’s decision to lend, is often referred to as “predatory” because consumers 
may be surprised, and harmed financially, by a lender’s motivations favoring default and foreclosure. See, e.g., 
Edward Gramlich, Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd., Remarks at the Housing Bureau for Seniors Conference, Ann 
Arbor, Michigan: Predatory Lending (Jan. 18, 2002), https://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/2002/ 
20020118/default.htm. 
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Lenders to sovereign governments make a similar calculus. True, a sover-
eign’s “income” is a rather different thing from a consumer’s income, consisting 
not only of revenue generated by the economy but of the power to tax. Likewise, 
a sovereign’s willingness to pay derives from different considerations, such as 
the political feasibility of imposing necessary tax increases.36 In both contexts, 
however, lenders understand that the threat of forced asset seizure does not as-
sure repayment. And in both contexts, lenders rely on mathematical models—
and, in the sovereign context, assessments of political risk—to assess ability and 
willingness to repay. In short, both sovereign and consumer lending are “income-
based.”37 Consumer and sovereign debt markets work not because of any threat 
of asset seizure, but because, for other reasons, both types of borrowers generally 
repay eventually, if not always on time. 
The similarities between sovereign and consumer lending have been largely 
overlooked. A few academics have drawn lessons from consumer debt in the 
context of sovereign lending.38 But for the most part, the corporate debt anal-
ogy—with its implications for sovereign restructuring—has dominated.39 We do 
not claim the consumer metaphor is perfect. Regulatory models from the con-
sumer debt markets cannot simply be transplanted into the sovereign debt mar-
kets. But metaphors, like theoretical models, can be useful even if they are wrong 
in material respects.40 And we think the metaphor is useful in distinguishing be-
tween corporate and “noncorporate” lending. 
III. THE SUPPLY SIDE OF EXCESSIVE SOVEREIGN DEBT 
Lending to sovereign governments takes many forms and involves many 
actors in the public and private sectors. Examples include: direct government-to-
government loans, the extension of credit by multilateral financial institutions 
such as the IMF, loans to support development projects made either by commer-
cial banks or by (or with the support of) national or multilateral development 
banks, direct lending by syndicates of commercial banks, and bond issues in 
 
 36.  Thus, the International Monetary Fund’s framework for determining debt sustainability regards debt 
as sustainable when the primary balance needed to at least stabilize the debt is both economically and politically 
feasible. See IMF, Staff Guidance Note for Public Debt Sustainability Analysis in Market-Access Countries, Pol-
icy Paper, at 4 (May 2013); see also COMM. ON INT’L ECON. POLICY AND REFORM, REVISITING SOVEREIGN 
BANKRUPTCY 36 (BROOKINGS 2013) (discussing how solvency measures must take factors such as willingness 
to tax into account) [hereinafter BROOKINGS REPORT]. 
 37. Block-Lieb, supra note 15, at 528. 
 38.  See MATTHIAS GOLDMANN, RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING: THE VIEW FROM 
DOMESTIC JURISDICTIONS: A COMPARATIVE SURVEY WRITTEN FOR THE UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON 
TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT (2012) (evaluating the UNCTAD Principles in light of national regulation of non-
sovereign lending, including lending to consumers); A. Mechele Dickerson, Insolvency Principles and the Odi-
ous Debt Doctrine: The Missing Link in the Debate, 70 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 53, 74–76 (2007) (drawing on 
insolvency principles applicable to consumer bankruptcy to analyze the doctrine of odious sovereign debt); Rob-
ert K. Rasmussen, Integrating a Theory of the State into Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 EMORY L.J. 1159, 
1181 (2004) (briefly comparing underwriting practices in consumer and sovereign lending markets). 
 39.  See supra notes 22–25 and accompanying text. 
 40.  GEORGE E.P. BOX & NORMAN R. DRAPER, EMPIRICAL MODEL-BUILDING AND RESPONSE SURFACES 
74 (1987). 
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which investment banks and other financial intermediaries place government-
issued securities in global capital markets.41 
It should be obvious that, in a global market with varied actors pursuing 
such varied motives, the definition of responsible lending will be contested and 
context-dependent. Whether the IMF has acted responsibly by lending to a dis-
tressed government under its Exceptional Access policy,42 for example, should 
not be judged by the same standards that might apply to a syndicate of for-profit 
commercial banks funding a government infrastructure project. 
Our primary, if not exclusive, interest is in exploring and clarifying the ob-
ligations of for-profit lenders operating in the sovereign debt markets and in the 
possibilities for regulating these entities in some sense. In such a vast market, 
involving many trillions of dollars in outstanding debt, it is odd to find discus-
sions of responsible lending relegated largely to the sidelines. Yet that is the re-
ality. To be sure, some regulatory initiatives indirectly impact the behavior of 
lenders in the sovereign debt markets. For instance, the risk weighting to be as-
signed sovereign debt under the Basel capital framework impacts the willingness 
of banks to hold government securities.43 But these exceptions do not represent 
any serious effort to determine appropriate standards of conduct for lenders. The 
explanation cannot be that the sovereign debt markets are functioning optimally. 
Indebtedness has declined from a peak in the late 1980s but remains dan-
gerously high for many countries.44 High debt leaves a government exposed to 
output shocks, contractions in the supply of global credit, and other negative 
events (such as infirmities in the banking sector).45 These risks are compounded 
when a government’s debt is denominated in a foreign currency, leaving it ex-
 
 41. See, e.g., Anna Gelpern, Sovereign Debt: Now What?, 41 YALE J. INT’L L. 45, 58–61 (2016) (describ-
ing mix of creditors involved in sovereign lending); Eugenio Cerutti, Galina Hale & Camelia Minoiu, Financial 
Crises and the Composition of Cross-Border Lending 5–25 (IMF Working Paper No. WP/14/185, 2014) (de-
scribing syndicated lending market), http://www.imf.org/en/publications. 
 42.  See, e.g., IMF, The Fund’s Lending Framework and Sovereign Debt—Further Considerations (Apr. 
2015) (describing exceptional access framework). 
 43.  On the link between risk weighting and bank incentives to hold sovereign debt in the run-up to the 
European debt crisis, see Jeffrey N. Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe, Bank Resolution in the European Banking 
Union: A Transatlantic Perspective on What it Would Take, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1297, 1304–05 (2015). See also 
Bank for International Settlements, International Banking and Financial Market Developments, BIS Q. REV. 1, 
10–11 (2013) (describing treatment of sovereign risk under Basel capital framework). 
 44.  Michael Tomz & Mark L. J. Wright, Empirical Research on Sovereign Debt and Default, 5 ANN. REV. 
ECON. 247, 251–52 (2013); Daniel A. Dias, Christine J. Richmond & Mark L. J. Wright, The Stock of External 
Sovereign Debt: Can We Take the Data at ‘Face Value’? 11–13 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
17551, 2011). 
 45.  Output contractions often precede default, although causal relationships are unclear. See, e.g., Michael 
Tomz and Mark L. J. Wright, Do Countries Default in “Bad Times”?, 5 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N. 352, 353 (2007); 
Eduardo Levy-Yeyati & Ugo Panizza, The Elusive Costs of Sovereign Defaults 14 (Inter-Am. Dev. Bank Re-
search Dep’t Working Paper 581, 2006). 
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posed to exchange rate fluctuations that can imperil its ability to respond to ad-
verse economic conditions.46 High debt levels can also have systemic conse-
quences quite apart from the risk of default. 
Although there is no clear causal relationship between government debt 
overhang and broader financial crisis,47 high levels of public debt are associated 
with lower growth.48 Moreover, high public debt can prolong a financial crisis 
that originates in the private sector by limiting the government’s ability to recap-
italize financial institutions, adopt countercyclical fiscal policy, or otherwise mit-
igate the effects of private sector deleveraging.49 Because governments cannot 
borrow if lenders will not lend, the fact of widespread over-indebtedness implies 
a need to examine more closely the behavior and incentives of lenders when 
making or arranging loans. 
A. Lender Incentives in the Sovereign Debt Markets 
From a sovereign borrower’s perspective, debt is excessive when “the so-
cial cost of an additional unit of debt is higher than the social value of an addi-
tional unit of expenditure.”50 The assumption embedded in this definition is that 
governments should not borrow except to advance social welfare. It is harder to 
define over-lending. Certainly, lenders do not seek to maximize social welfare in 
the borrowing state. At the least, any definition must include lending decisions 
that “differ from what we would observe in the presence of perfect markets.”51 
This is a minimalist definition, extending to loans that are mispriced (in the sense 
that expected return does not correspond to risk), but perhaps not much further. 
As will become clear from our discussion of responsible consumer lending reg-
ulation, there is no obvious reason why the definition of lender responsibility 
should be so limited. For present purposes, however, we focus our attention on 
reasons why lenders might make or facilitate loans without adequately account-
ing for the risk of default.   
1. Agency Problems 
Some incentives for over-lending stem from agency problems within lend-
ers and lending markets. In a stylized commercial loan, the lender will carefully 
assess the borrower’s ability and willingness to repay before making the loan. In 
 
 46.  See, e.g., Barry Eichengreen, Ricardo Hausmann & Ugo Panizza, The Pain of Original Sin, in OTHER 
PEOPLE’S MONEY: DEBT DENOMINATION AND FINANCIAL INSTABILITY IN EMERGING MARKET ECONOMIES 13 
(2005). 
 47.  IMF, Debt: Use it Wisely, Fiscal Monitor, at 11 (Oct. 2016); Oscar Jorda, Moritz Schularick & Alan 
Taylor, Sovereigns Versus Banks: Credit, Crises, and Consequences, 14 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N 45, 64 (2016). 
 48.  Carmen M. Reinhart, Vincent R. Reinhart & Kenneth S. Rogoff, Public Debt Overhangs: Advanced 
Economy Episodes Since 1800, 26 J. ECON. PERSP. 69, 83–85 (2012). 
 49.  IMF, Debt: Use it Wisely, supra note 47, at 11; Jorda, Schularick & Taylor, supra note 47, at 47. 
 50. Yuefen Li & Ugo Panizza, The Economic Rationale for the Principles on Promoting Responsible Sov-
ereign Lending and Borrowing, in SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 15, 28–29 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2013). 
 51.  Id. at 29. 
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a stylized bond issuance, the underwriter has some incentive to undertake a sim-
ilar assessment, for it may incur reputational and legal costs if the issuer defaults 
(in addition, of course, to the losses it may take on any bonds it holds).52 In prac-
tice, a number of factors cause departures from these stylized models. 
For instance, markets may be structured to diminish the loan originator’s 
incentive to assess default risk. To use an example from outside the world of 
sovereign debt, securitization of residential home mortgages, and the shift from 
an investment to a “sales” business model, created incentives for originators to 
maximize the supply of home loans without adequately accounting for default 
risk.53 In sovereign debt markets, the ability to transfer risk to third parties may 
likewise diminish incentives for originators or underwriters to realistically assess 
(or disclose) the probability of default.54 In bond lending, underwriters may also 
have some incentive to downplay risks, for fear of losing business from high-
volume issuers of securities.55 
In theory, credit rating agencies can mitigate these tendencies, but there is 
cause for doubt. For instance, the use of credit ratings in regulatory capital stand-
ards may create incentives to inflate ratings of investment grade sovereign issu-
ers.56 An issuer-pays compensation model also may give credit-rating agencies 
an incentive to inflate ratings.57 
Agency problems within lending institutions may also contribute to exces-
sive lending. One reason is that agents with the power to influence lending or 
 
 52. In the early 20th century, investors may have used underwriter reputation as a proxy for the quality of 
a bond issue. See Marc Flandreau, Norbert Gaillard & Ugo Panizza, Conflicts of Interest, Reputation, and the 
Interwar Debt Crisis: Banksters or Bad Luck? 4 (Graduate Inst. of Int’l and Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 
02/2010, 2010); Marc Flandreau, Juan H. Flores Norbert Gaillard & Sebastián Nieto-Parra, The Changing Role 
of Global Financial Brands in the Underwriting of Foreign Government Debt (1815-2010) 23–28 (Graduate Inst. 
of Int’l and Dev. Studies, Working Paper No. 15-201, 2011). Lawyers may play a similar role. See Michael 
Bradley, Irving De Lira Salvatierra & Mitu Gulati, Lawyers: Gatekeepers of the Sovereign Debt Market? 38 
INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 150, 150 (2013) (finding, however, that hiring outside lawyers sends a negative signal as 
to issue quality).   
 53.  Susan Block-Lieb & Edward Janger, Demand-Side Gatekeepers in the Market for Home Loans, 82 
TEMP. L. REV. 465, 469–75 (2009) (describing how changes in mortgage underwriting created incentives to make 
risky loans); Jonathan Macey, Geoffrey D. Miller, Maureen O’Hara & Gabriel Rosenberg, Helping Law Catch 
Up to Markets: Applying Broker-Dealer Law to Subprime Mortgages, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 842 (2009) (noting the 
role of securitization in shaping the incentives of mortgage brokers). 
 54.  See, e.g., Li & Panizza, supra note 50, at 30. Moreover, regulatory schemes may undermine under-
writing standards. See, e.g., CLAIRE A. HILL & RICHARD W. PAINTER, BETTER BANKERS, BETTER BANKS 81–82 
(Univ. of Chicago Press 2015). 
 55.  PAUL BLUSTEIN, AND THE MONEY KEPT ROLLING IN (AND OUT) 62–74 (2005). 
 56.  For general discussion of criticisms of credit rating agencies in sovereign debt markets, and evidence 
on the historic role and function of these agencies, see generally NORBERT GAILLARD, A CENTURY OF SOVEREIGN 
RATINGS (Springer 2012). 
 57.  Similar concerns have been expressed about the role of credit rating agencies in the residential home 
mortgage context. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 53, at 474; Timothy E. Lynch, Deeply and Persistently 
Conflicted: Credit Ratings Agencies in the Current Regulatory Environment, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 227, 246–
48 (2009); Frank Partnoy, How and Why Credit Rating Agencies Are Not Like Other Gatekeepers, in FINANCIAL 
GATEKEEPERS: CAN THEY PROTECT INVESTORS? 59, 60 (Yasuyuki Fuchita & Robert E. Litan eds., 2006); see 
also Claire A. Hill, Regulating the Rating Agencies, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 43, 50–51 (2004) (noting risk of issuer-
pays model but emphasizing potentially greater risk that issuers might withhold ancillary (i.e., non-ratings) busi-
ness from ratings agencies that do not provide favorable ratings). 
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underwriting decisions often benefit if a loan is made but bear no personal risk 
if the loan is not repaid.58 For instance, a bank’s compensation structure may not 
tie compensation to loan performance. Buchheit and Gulati partially attribute ex-
cessive sovereign lending by commercial banks during the 1970s and 1980s to 
the practice of charging high origination fees, which banks treated as income 
during the year of origination rather than amortizing over the life of the loan.59 
Because loan officers were compensated as a function of the bank’s income for 
the year, this produced incentives to push large loans.60 
2. Excessive Optimism and Herd Behavior 
Incentives to over-lend can be magnified by herd behavior—i.e., wide-
spread over-optimism leading to excessive risk-taking.61 Commercial loan offic-
ers, investment bankers, and other professionals involved in sovereign lending 
are sophisticated actors. But even they may “suffer from the behavioral biases 
that drive investor confidence and stock market bubbles.”62 Financial profession-
als may be susceptible to groupthink, may overestimate their capacity to judge 
risk, and may exhibit a range of cognitive errors that cause them to underestimate 
risks.63 These tendencies may partially explain the short memory of market par-
ticipants—the recurring belief, in the terms of Reinhart and Rogoff, that “this 
time is different.”64 
If lenders are prone to over-optimism, this may help explain the surprising 
procyclicality of sovereign borrowing. Models of sovereign debt often assume 
borrowing is countercyclical; the idea that when economic activity slows, gov-
ernments borrow to smooth consumption.65 Evidence indicates, however, that 
borrowing is often procyclical.66 That is, borrowing increases when times are 
 
 58. Li & Panizza, supra note 50, at 30 (“[A]sset managers may try to generate fake alpha by adopting a 
strategy that leads to excess returns in most states of the world but hides an enormous tail risk.”); Christian Barry 
& Lydia Tomitova, Fairness in Sovereign Debt, 73 SOC. RES. 649, 671 (2006) (noting that the originator of a 
sovereign loan “may benefit himself by broadening his portfolio, yet be long gone when the sovereign becomes 
unable to repay . . . .”). For a proposal to address this mismatch of incentives, see HILL & PAINTER, supra note 
54, at 190–92. 
 59.  Lee C. Buchheit & Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 63, 78–79 (2010). 
 60.  In the United States, federal law now requires loan origination fees to be amortized over the loan term 
in many cases. See 12 U.S.C. § 3905(a)(1) (2018). 
 61.  BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 36, at 9. 
 62.  ERIK F. GERDING, LAW, BUBBLES, AND FINANCIAL REGULATION 207 (New York: Routledge 2014). 
See also Stephen G. Cecchetti, MS Mohanty & Fabrizio Zampolli, The Future of Public Debt: Prospects and 
Implications 1 (Bank for Int’l Settlements, Working Paper No. 300, 2010) (noting that “bond traders are notori-
ously short-sighted”). 
 63.  Roland Bénabou, Groupthink: Collective Delusions in Organizations and Markets, 80 REV. ECON. 
STUD. 429, 457 (2013). 
 64.  See generally REINHART & ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT, supra note 2. 
 65.  See, e.g., Panizza et al., supra note 6, at 14–17 (discussing assumption of counter-cyclicality and con-
trary evidence). 
 66.  Eduardo Levy Yeyati, Optimal Debt? On the Insurance Value of International Debt Flows to Devel-
oping Countries, 20 OPEN ECONOMIES REV. 489, 491 (2009); Enrique Alberola and José Manuel Montero, Debt 
Sustainability and Procyclical Fiscal Policies in Latin America 9 (Banco de España, Working Paper No. 0611, 
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good and international capital is plentiful and cheap. Of course, someone must 
make these loans in the first place, and if sovereigns are running up large debts 
in good times, one might question whether they will be able to repay when the 
bad times arrive. Lender over-optimism may be part of the explanation. 
3. Debt Dilution and the Lack of Priority Rules 
Weak legal enforcement is an important characteristic of sovereign debt.67 
No tribunal can compel a sovereign to repay or surrender enough assets to satisfy 
creditor claims.68 The net result may be a reduction to the overall amount of sov-
ereign debt. Lenders should more readily extend credit when courts have power 
to enforce their claims.69 In at least one respect, however, weak enforcement can 
provide a perverse incentive to over-lending. The risk stems from the fact that no 
tribunal can enforce payment priorities specified in sovereign loan contracts.70 
The risk of debt dilution is one consequence of the lack of enforceable pri-
orities. New loans incurred by a financially distressed borrower may increase 
default risk and reduce the recovery value of existing loans (because more cred-
itors will have claims against the borrower’s resources).71 New lenders can price 
these risks into their loans; old lenders cannot. Anticipating this risk, lenders may 
demand a premium to compensate for the risk of dilution72 or may structure loans 
in suboptimal ways.73 In corporate lending markets, secured debt mitigates these 
concerns.74 Lenders entitled to priority have less reason to fear dilution; they are 
entitled to be paid in full before junior creditors receive anything. But sovereign 
borrowers cannot easily make credible promises of seniority.75 Without an en-
forceable priority structure, new lenders have an incentive to lend, even as the 
sovereign nears financial distress.76 
 
2006); Michael Gavin et al., Managing Fiscal Policy in Latin America and the Caribbean: Volatility, Procycli-
cality, and Limited Creditworthiness 3 (Inter-American Development Bank, Working Paper No. 326, 1996); 
Graciela L. Kaminsky et al., When it Rains, it Pours: Procyclical Capital Flows and Macroeconomic Policies 1 
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10780, 2004). 
 67. See, e.g., Aguiar & Amador, supra note 6, at 647. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Patrick Bolton & David A. Skeel, Jr., Redesigning the International Lender of Last Resort, 6 CHI. J. 
INT’L L. 177, 189 (2005). 
 70. Id. at 185–86. 
 71. Id. at 185. 
 72.  Borensztein et al., supra note 11, at 4. 
 73.  For example, lenders might insist on short-term loans that create repeat rollover risk. See Kenneth M. 
Kletzer, Asymmetries of Information and LDC Borrowing with Sovereign Risk, 94 ECON. J. 287, 299–300 (1984); 
Juan Carlos Hatchondo et al., Debt Dilution and Sovereign Default Risk 3 (Int’l Monetary Fund, Working Paper 
No. 11/70, 2011). 
 74.  See generally EUGENE F. FAMA & MERTON H. MILLER, THE THEORY OF FINANCE (1972). 
 75.  A sampling of the academic literature on the problem of debt dilution includes, Bolton & Jeanne, supra 
note 26, at 881; Bolton & Skeel, supra note 69, at 198; Borensztein et al., supra note 11; Hatchondo et al., supra 
note 73, at 3. 
 76.  Christine Jenkins Tanzi & Fabiola Zerpa, Goldman Sachs Just Ignited the “Hunger Bonds” Movement, 
BLOOMBERG (May 31, 2017, 9:54 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-05-31/goldman-sachs-
gave-big-hand-to-venezuela-hunger-bonds-movement. 
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4. Moral Hazard 
Lenders may also discount the risk posed by a sovereign borrower because 
they expect other governments or official lenders to intervene. The Euro area is 
an often-cited example. The convergence of bond yields across countries within 
the monetary union77 implies that investors did not consider the different default 
risks presented by EU member states. One reason may be the perception that 
governments, worried about the systemic consequences of a member state’s de-
fault, will step in with emergency loans, the proceeds of which may be used to 
repay private lenders.78 
5. Capitalizing on Information Asymmetries and Other “Predatory” 
Practices 
At first glance, governments would appear to be exceptionally well-in-
formed borrowers. Many manage debt through professionalized finance minis-
tries staffed by economists and other highly trained staff.79 Many also retain ex-
ternal advisors to guide debt management decisions.80 Yet there is also risk that, 
in some cases, lenders seek higher returns by offering complicated products 
whose costs are not readily apparent to government officials. At least some civil 
society groups have expressed this concern,81 which echoes similar concerns ex-
pressed in the context of U.S. municipal finance.82 
6. Some Examples 
One need not look far to find examples consistent with the incentives de-
scribed above. As noted, Venezuela is experiencing an economic and humanitar-
ian crisis.83 During the pre-crisis boom fueled by high oil prices (roughly 2006–
2012), the country found plenty of lenders willing to fuel a procyclical borrowing 
binge.84 Its foreign debt sharply increased even as expenditures far outpaced rev-
enues.85 As its financial position deteriorated—indeed, even as Venezuela be-
came the world’s most indebted country and citizens took to the streets to protest 
 
 77. Michael Ehrmann et al., Convergence and Anchoring of Yield Curves in the Euro Area, 93 REV. ECON. 
& STAT. 350, 350 (2011). 
 78.  Greece is the most notable recent example. See, e.g., Paul Blustein, Laid Low: The IMF, the Euro Zone 
and the First Rescue of Greece 6 (Centre for International Governance Innovation, Working Paper No. 61, 2015). 
 79.  Anna Gelpern et al., If Boilerplate Could Talk: The Work of Standard Terms in Sovereign Bond Con-
tracts, 44 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 617 (2019). 
 80. Id. at 44. 
 81.  See ELLMERS & TODOULOS, supra note 14. 
 82.  See generally Adam Feibelman, Fiduciary Duties and Public Finance: Experimenting with Municipal 
Financial Advisors (June 24, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 83.  Jacoby, supra note 4. 
 84. Anabella Abadi M., Corruption and Phantom Bonds, CARACAS CHRONICLES (June 9, 2017), 
https://www.caracaschronicles.com/2017/06/09/corruption-and-phantom-bonds. 
 85.  Id.; Dany Bahar & Miguel Ángel Santos, The Road Ahead in Venezuela: Navigating through a Rough 
Sea of Economic Crisis, BROOKINGS (Jan. 4, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-front/2016/01/04/the-
road-ahead-in-venezuela-navigating-through-a-rough-sea-of-economic-crisis. 
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food shortages86—the government was able to tap new sources of foreign capital, 
albeit at extravagant interest rates.87 
Perhaps the most notable example involves the issuance of substantial 
amounts of debt at a dramatic discount from face value (“original issue dis-
count”).88 That the financially strapped Venezuelan government was issuing 
such debt came to light in May 2017 in connection with the so-called “Hunger 
Bonds.”89 These bonds were issued by state oil company PDVSA with a face 
value of $2.8 billion and a 6% coupon, but reportedly sold to Goldman Sachs for 
only $865 million (thirty-one cents on the dollar).90 This may be the tip of the 
iceberg. The Venezuelan government reportedly has a history of issuing bonds 
to its central bank, which later resells the bonds at substantial discounts when the 
government needs funds.91 Many of PDVSA’s bonds, as well as promissory 
notes issued to unpaid suppliers, also reportedly involve substantially inflated 
face values.92 By incurring new debt of any type, the government likely reduced 
the value of its existing debt. This is the nature of debt dilution.93 But debt issued 
with inflated face values has an additional consequence: forcing existing credi-
tors to bear a disproportionate share of the pain of default.94 
 
 86.  See Ricardo Hausmann, Venezuela’s Unprecedented Collapse, PROJECT SYNDICATE (July 31, 2017), 
https://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/venezuela-unprecedented-economic-collapse-by-ricardo-haus-
mann-2017-07?barrier=accesspaylog. 
 87.  Frank Muci, Meth Finance, CARACAS CHRONS. (May 29, 2017), https://www.caracaschroni-
cles.com/2017/05/29/meth-finance. In 2017, sanctions effectively shut Venezuela out of US credit markets. See 
Anne Gearan & Anthony Faiola, Trump Tightens Venezuela’s Access to U.S. Financial System, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 25, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/trump-administration-moves-to-re-
strict-venezuelan-access-to-us-financial-system/2017/08/25/18b22a5e-89ad-11e7-a50f-e0d4e6ec070a_story. 
html?utm_term=.da6fda7845c6. 
 88. As an example, consider a bond with a face amount of $100 payable at maturity and a $5 yearly coupon, 
for which the issuer receives proceeds of only $60. The difference between the issue price and the bond’s par 
value ($40) is a form of interest, realized by holding the bond to maturity. 1 HANDBOOK OF FINANCE: FINANCIAL 
MARKETS AND INSTRUMENTS 250–51 (Frank J. Fabozzi ed., 2008). In a corporate bankruptcy, unamortized OID 
constitutes unmatured interest and is not part of a creditor’s allowable claim. See, e.g., LTV Corp. v. Valley Fid. 
Bank & Trust Co., 961 F.2d 378, 380–81 (2d Cir. 1992). 
 89. Jacoby, supra note 4. 
 90.  Ricardo Hausmann, The Hunger Bonds, PROJECT SYNDICATE (May 26, 2017), https://www.project-
syndicate.org/commentary/maduro-venezuela-hunger-bonds-by-ricardo-hausmann-2017-05?barrier=accesspay-
log. Goldman reportedly purchased the bonds on the secondary market, although under circumstances suggesting 
that the secondary market price may determine the extent of original issue discount. (The bonds were originally 
held by the Venezuelan central bank). See Kejal Vyas & Anatoly Kurmanaev, Goldman Sachs Bought Vene-
zuela’s State Oil Company’s Bonds Last Week, WALL ST. J. (May 28, 2017, 10:19 PM), https://www.wsj.com/ar-
ticles/goldman-sachs-bought-venezuelan-oil-co-bonds-last-week-1496020176. 
 91.  Lewis McLellan, Venezuelan Bonds: A Moral Minefield, GLOBALCAP. (June 13, 2017) https:// 
www.globalcapital.com/article/b13f4gk8d5mc7b/venezuelan-bonds-a-moral-minefield. 
 92. Mark A. Walker & Richard J. Cooper, Venezuela’s Restructuring: A Realistic Framework 27–28 (Sept. 
19, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3039678. 
 93.  See discussion supra Subsection III.A.3. 
 94.  To take a stylized example: Assume a debt default followed by an acceleration, leaving all bondholders 
with claims for the full principal amount of the debt plus accrued (but not unaccrued) interest. Assume further 
that the government must reduce the principal amount of its outstanding debt by 50% to regain financial footing. 
Using the facts reported about the Hunger Bonds as an example, a restructuring with a 50% loss of principal 
would still result in a tidy profit over the reported sale price of $865 million. By contrast, had the bonds been 
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Or take Greece, which continues to struggle more than nine years after an 
unprecedented bailout from other eurozone governments, and more than seven 
years after undertaking the largest sovereign debt restructuring in history.95 Be-
fore the crisis, Greek government debt ballooned, as financial institutions under-
wrote, and investors eagerly bought, government debt seemingly without regard 
to risk.96 The fact that pre-crisis Greek bond yields closely approximated yields 
on German bonds implies moral hazard,97 the expectation of a bailout was ulti-
mately validated in 2010, when other eurozone governments backstopped Greek 
debt to save their own banks.98 
As a final example, also involving Greece, consider a complex loan struc-
tured as a currency swap and arranged by Goldman Sachs in 2001.99 The appar-
ent goal of the transaction was to reduce the amount of debt Greece would have 
to report, helping it comply with the Maastricht Treaty, which limits the debt that 
can be taken on by eurozone member countries.100 Although the transaction ap-
parently broke no rules, it left the government saddled with payment obligations 
that vastly exceeded expectations, at least as government officials later charac-
terized the transaction.101 If this account is accurate, then the transaction raises 
concerns about the use of complex loan structures to exploit information asym-
metries. In the words of one subsequent official, the Greek government simply 
“didn’t understand what it was buying.”102 
B. Responsible Sovereign Lending Proposals 
Observers of the sovereign debt markets have recognized incentives for 
lenders to extend credit without adequately accounting for risk.103 Yet there is 
little in the way of mainstream policy discourse about appropriate responses. The 
exceptions tend to originate from civil society groups such as the European Net-
work on Debt and Development and intergovernmental bodies such as 
 
purchased for par, with a coupon significantly over 6% to compensate for default risk, the same restructuring 
would result in a significant loss, as the investor would not be compensated for unaccrued interest. 
 95.  See Miranda Xafa, Lessons from the 2012 Greek Debt Restructuring, VOX (June 25, 2014), https:// 
voxeu.org/article/greek-debt-restructuring-lessons-learned. 
 96. James Mackintosh, Playing Morality with Greek Markets, FIN. TIMES (July 6, 2015), https://www. 
ft.com/content/8db1ae58-23b9-11e5-9c4e-a775d2b173ca. 
 97.  See Matt Phillips, The Complete History of the Greek Debt Drama in Charts, QUARTZ (June 30, 2015), 
https://qz.com/440058/the-complete-history-of-the-greek-debt-drama-in-charts/. 
 98. See Steve Slater & Lionel Laurent, Europe’s Banks Bleed from Greek Debt Crisis, REUTERS (Feb. 23, 
2012, 4:24 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-banks/europes-banks-bleed-from-greek-debt-crisis-
idUSTRE81M0LT20120223. 
 99.  For details, see HILL & PAINTER, supra note 54, at 54–55; Nicholas Dunbar & Elisa Martinuzzi, Gold-
man Secret Greece Loan Shows Two Sinners as Client Unravels, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 5, 2012, 6:01 PM), https:// 
www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-03-06/goldman-secret-greece-loan-shows-two-sinners-as-client-un-
ravels. 
 100.  HILL & PAINTER, supra note 54, at 54-55. 
 101.  See Dunbar and Martinuzzi, supra note 99 (reporting debt management official’s report that Greece 
initially owed 600 million euros on a loan of 2.8 billion euros, but that the price of the transaction later rose to 
5.1 billion euros). 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  See, e.g., BROOKINGS REPORT, supra note 36, at 8–9; ELLMERS & TODOULOS, supra note 14. 
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UNCTAD.104 Eurodad’s Responsible Finance Charter, for instance, seeks to 
identify substantive standards to govern loans or investments made with a devel-
opmental purpose.105 The UNCTAD Principles on Promoting Responsible Sov-
ereign Lending and Borrowing aim to encourage “prudent and disciplined” lend-
ing and borrowing.106 Though framed as an effort to identify best practices, the 
Principles often speak in terms of responsibilities or duties owed by lenders and 
borrowers in the sovereign debt markets.107 
These and similar initiatives aim to promote reform across a wide range of 
substantive domains.108 With regard to the regulation of lenders, for example, 
both the Eurodad Responsible Finance Charter and the UNCTAD Principles ar-
ticulate standards to govern not just the making of loans but also a range of post-
loan conduct, such as, enforcement by entities that may have played no role in 
the decision to extend credit. As an example, Eurodad’s conception of “respon-
sible” finance includes, among other things: (1) disclosure obligations (e.g., with 
regard to loan terms and repayment assumptions);109 (2) a ban on assignment of 
loans without borrower consent;110 and (3) an apparent requirement that enforce-
ment occur only in the borrower’s domestic courts or international arbitration.111 
Likewise, UNCTAD’s Principles describe the responsibilities of lenders at the 
time the loan is made,112 but also recognize obligations associated with debt en-
forcement, effectively regulating distressed debt buyers and other entities not in-
volved in the making of the loan.113 
 
 104. ELLMERS & TODOULOS, supra note 14. 
 105.  EUROPEAN NETWORK ON DEBT & DEV., RESPONSIBLE FINANCE CHARTER 1 (2011) [hereinafter 
RESPONSIBLE FINANCE CHARTER]. 
 106.  UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE & DEV., PRINCIPLES ON PROMOTING RESPONSIBLE 
SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING 4 (2012) [hereinafter UNCTAD Principles]. For background on the 
UNCTAD Principles, see GOLDMANN, supra note 38. 
 107. UNCTAD Principles, supra note106, at 4 (characterizing the project as an effort to identify “basic 
principles and best practices”). 
 108.  For instance, the Principles for Stable Capital Flows and Fair Debt Restructuring in the Emerging 
Markets aims among other things to improve disclosures regarding the borrower’s political and economic condi-
tions. See Eric Helleiner, Filling a Hole in Global Financial Governance? The Politics of Regulating Sovereign 
Debt Restructuring, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL REGULATION 89, 90–91 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 
2009). For a summary of related initiatives, see Anna Gelpern, Hard, Soft, and Embedded: Implementing Prin-
ciples on Promoting Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing, in SOVEREIGN FINANCING AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: THE UNCTAD PRINCIPLES ON RESPONSIBLE SOVEREIGN LENDING AND BORROWING 347, 
358 (2013). 
 109.  For instance, provisions A(i)(5)–(7) of Eurodad’s Technical and Legal Terms and Conditions require 
disclosure of repayment assumptions, interest rates, and debt service obligations. See RESPONSIBLE FINANCE 
CHARTER, supra note 1055, at 14. 
 110.  Provision A(i)(12) forbids secondary market sales without “the free and informed consent of the bor-
rower.” Id. at 14. 
 111.  See id. at 18 (Dispute Settlement Provisions G(II)(2) & (3)). Lenders, and investors who buy distressed 
loans, prefer clauses providing for enforcement in foreign courts. See W. Mark C. Weidemaier, Disputing Boil-
erplate, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 6, 26–27 (2009). 
 112.  For example, lenders must “provide information . . . to assist borrowers in making informed credit 
decisions.” UNCTAD Principles, supra note 106, at 5 (Principle 2: Informed Decisions). 
 113.  Principle 7, for instance, recognizes a duty to negotiate in good faith over a restructuring. The com-
ments assert that a creditor that acquires sovereign debt “with the intent of forcing a preferential settlement of 
the claim outside of a consensual workout process is acting abusively.” Id. at 7–8. 
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Even when responsible lending standards target narrower domains, they 
can be imprecise about the conduct they seek to regulate. For example, 
UNCTAD Principle 4 asserts that lenders must “make a realistic assessment of 
the sovereign borrower’s capacity to service a loan.”114 This phrasing indicates 
a relatively modest obligation—akin, as we will discuss, to some “ability to pay” 
regulation in the consumer finance context—to assess the borrower’s ability to 
make periodic interest or coupon payments, rather than a duty to assess the bor-
rower’s capacity to repay the loan in full without new borrowing.115 The explan-
atory text accompanying Principle 4, however, arguably implies a broader duty 
to account for the borrower’s financial context and even the impact of the loan 
on other creditors.116 
Our point is twofold. First, the mainstream sovereign debt literature recog-
nizes that lenders can have problematic incentives but makes little effort to define 
appropriate lender behavior or to explore regulatory solutions. Second, the ex-
ceptions—largely civil-society-led reform initiatives—tend to use “responsible” 
lending as a catch-all term encompassing a wide range of prescriptions aimed at 
a wider range of problematic behaviors associated with making or enforcing sov-
ereign loans. 
We do not mean this as serious criticism of these reform initiatives. Euro-
dad’s Charter, UNCTAD’s Principles, and similar proposals seek to produce 
change through a process of engagement and consensus-building, and this instru-
mental goal requires a certain breadth of scope and conceptual generality.117 
Nonetheless, painting with such broad strokes leaves a gap in the sovereign debt 
literature. With such a vast lending market, it is odd that one side of the lender-
borrower equation receives such little attention and that existing proposals to 
promote responsible sovereign lending are so short on details. Experience with 
consumer debt and lending regulation provides potentially important insights, to 
which we now turn. 
IV. PARALLELS IN CONSUMER LOAN MARKETS 
Like sovereign debt, consumer lending can take many forms: short and long 
term debt; secured and unsecured debt; and term loans and loans extended on a 
revolving basis. Like loans extended to sovereign borrowers, lending to individ-
uals for household purposes has grown exponentially,118 to an extent that the re-
cent global financial crisis has been attributed, at least in part, to its very size and 
 
 114.  Id. at 6. 
 115. See infra Subsection III.C.1. 
 116. The explanatory text abandons the term “service” for the (potentially broader) “capacity to repay.” 
And by emphasizing that new lending can “adversely affect[] the position of all other creditors,” the explanatory 
text invokes concerns about debt dilution and hints at inter-creditor duties. UNCTAD Principles, supra note106, 
at 6. 
 117.  Gelpern, supra note108, at 3. 
 118.  The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System has collected data on consumer credit out-
standing in US markets since 1943. FED. RESERVE SYS., CONSUMER CREDIT-G19: HISTORICAL DATA, https:// 
www.federalreserve.gov/releases/G19/HIST/default.htm. Broadly, these data show levels of consumer credit, 
defined as credit extended to individuals for household, family, and other personal expenditures, including both 
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volatility.119 As in the sovereign context, many argue that outstanding household 
credit is not only growing but a growing source of problems. 
In addition to these similarities, this Part illustrates a key difference be-
tween sovereign and consumer debt. In the consumer context, the decision to 
lend (or borrow) is considered an important point of regulatory intervention. 
Much consumer financial regulation is designed to enhance consumers’ access 
to information about credit markets and protect against ingrained decision-mak-
ing biases, and that need is reduced—although not entirely absent—in sovereign 
debt markets. But other consumer lending regulation attempts to alter lenders’ 
incentives to engage in imprudent, excessively risky lending, and here there are 
striking similarities between consumer and sovereign debt. 
A. The Incentives of Consumer Lenders 
Consumer lending involves incentives for over-lending analogous to those 
present in sovereign debt markets. Commentators generally agree that consumers 
borrow to smooth income levels that are mismatched with life cycle demands for 
expenditure on housing and capital goods,120 and more recently accept that over-
borrowing may be the result of an individual’s financial imprudence and unfore-
seen shocks to his or her income.121 A few argue that borrowers’ strategic behav-
ior best explains borrowing behaviors.122 This exclusive focus on borrowers 
 
revolving and terms loans, secured and unsecured loans, but excluding loans secured by real estate, outstanding 
as of January 1943 at $6.6 billion and $4 trillion by January 2019. Id. The Federal Reserve Board also collects 
data on residential and other mortgage debt obligations, and has done so since 1949. These data show that con-
sumer residential mortgage debt rose at similarly steep rates, from $29 billion in Q4 1949 to $10.9 trillion in Q4 
2018. See FED. RESERVE SYS., MORTGAGE DEBT OUTSTANDING, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/re-
leases/mortoutstand/current.htm. For easily comprehensible reasons, residential mortgage debt outstanding 
peaked in Q1 2008 at roughly $11.3 trillion, and has not yet returned to this pre-Crisis level. Id. 
 119.  See, e.g., FINAL REPORT, NAT’L COMM’N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S. 
83–101 (2011), https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf. [hereinafter Federal Crisis In-
quiry Commission] (“The Commission concludes that there was untrammeled growth in risky mortgages. Un-
sustainable, toxic loans polluted the financial system and fueled the housing bubble.”). 
 120.  For classic citations of this “life-cycle” theory of consumer borrowing, see, for example, ANGUS 
DEATON, UNDERSTANDING CONSUMPTION 45–59 (Oxford Univ. Press eds. 1992); MILTON FRIEDMAN, A 
THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 214–19 (Princeton Univ. Press eds. 1957); Franco Modigliani & Rich-
ard Brumberg, Utility Analysis and the Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data, in POST-
KEYNESIAN ECONOMICS (K. K. Kurihara ed. 1954). 
 121.  For discussion of the range of life circumstances that “push” individuals into consumer bankruptcy, 
see Barry Z. Cynamon & Steven M. Fazzari, Too Much Spending or Too Little Income? The Macroeconomics of 
Household Spending and Debt, in WORKING AND LIVING IN THE SHADOW OF ECONOMIC FRAGILITY 44–47 (Mar-
ion G. Crain & Michael Serraden eds., Oxford Univ. Press 2014); TERESA A. SULLIVAN, ELIZABETH WARREN & 
JAY LAWRENCE WESTBROOK, THE FRAGILE MIDDLE CLASS: AMERICANS IN DEBT 80–85 (Yale Univ. Press 2001); 
RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 19, at 5. 
 122.  For discussion of the claim that consumer borrowers “gamed” the system by incurring excessive debt 
obligations, knowing that a discharge in bankruptcy would right the situation, see, for example, Edith H. Jones 
& Todd J. Zywicki, It’s Time for Means Testing, 1999 B.Y.U. L. REV. 177, 183 (1998). For less moralistic state-
ments of rational actor models of consumer borrowing, see, for example, Barry Adler et al., Regulating Consumer 
Bankruptcy: A Theoretical Inquiry, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 585, 591 (2000). Jones and Zywicki’s “strategic actor” 
model of consumer financial decision-making prompted Congress to enact the “means testing” proposal they 
offered. For discussion of the politics of enactment of the 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer 
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leaves lenders out of the equation. Loans are bilateral. In the absence of fraud or 
deceptive practices, both a lender and borrower must agree to the transaction. 
What, then, explains over-lending? Motivations to extend credit seem 
straightforward for rational lenders: they look to earn a profit.123 More specifi-
cally, consumer lenders expect the aggregate revenue they earn from their lend-
ing portfolios (interest income plus other income plus expected benefit of prin-
cipal repaid over time) to exceed their aggregate costs from extending loans  
(cost of funds + administrative costs + [default risk multiplied by outstanding 
principal]). 
Why would rational lenders extend credit to borrowers who do not under-
stand the transaction and, as a result of this imprudence, are unlikely to weather 
unforeseen (but not unforeseeable) events? Extensive defaults undermine lend-
ers’ profits. As a result, we would expect lenders with imperfect information 
about borrowers’ strategic incentives to invest in efforts to weed out bad credit 
risks and thereby to minimize the aggregate risk of default.124 Credit reporting 
and credit scoring tools assist in this sorting, but do not perfectly predict de-
fault.125 From this perspective, over-lending is mostly the result of lenders’ in-
formational asymmetries: that is, lenders extend too much credit because they 
cannot perfectly predict which borrowers will default.126 
The recent global financial crisis, which most agree was at least in part a 
crisis of unregulated over-lending to consumers,127 raised questions about this 
conventional story of lenders’ incentives. Modern scholarship posits several ex-
planations for why well-informed, rational lenders might lend excessively. 
1. Agency Problems 
Commentators focus on the problematic externalization of default risk 
caused by widespread securitization of household debt.128 Where a loan is ex-
tended with the expectation that it will be distributed to a securitization vehicle, 
 
Protection Act, P.L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (April 20, 2005), and alternative solutions to the “problem” of con-
sumer borrowing, see, for example, Susan Block-Lieb & Edward J. Janger, The Myth of the Rational Borrower: 
Behaviorism, Rationality, and the Misguided Reform of Bankruptcy Law, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1481, 1481–82 (2006); 
John A.E. Pottow, Private Liability for Reckless Consumer Lending, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 405, 407 (2007). 
 123.  See Adler et al., supra note122, at 586–88. 
 124. For several classical statements of economic theory of borrowing, see, for example, William H. Meck-
ling, Financial Markets, Default, and Bankruptcy: The Role of the State, 41 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 13, 22 (1977); 
Joseph E. Stiglitz & Andrew Weiss, Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 
393, 394 (1981). 
 125.  But see Liran Einav et al., The Impact of Credit Scoring on Consumer Lending, 44 RAND J. ECON. 
249 (2013) (empirically identifying two distinct benefits of risk classification through credit scoring models: the 
ability to screen high-risk borrowers and the ability to target more generous loans to lower-risk borrowers and 
demonstrating the magnitude of these beneficial effects for one segment of markets for consumer finance). 
 126.  Stiglitz & Weiss, supra note124, at 393. 
 127.  Federal Crisis Inquiry Commission, supra note 119, at xvii; RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 19, at 
11–13; see also Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 122, at 1486–90. 
 128.  For description of the agency problems caused by securitization of residential mortgage-backed secu-
rities, see, for example, KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: RECKLESS CREDIT, 
REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS 17–19 (2011); Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 53, at 470. 
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with the vehicle thereafter issuing bonds secured by the transferred debt that are, 
in turn, sold to the capital markets, loan originators face distinctly greater incen-
tives to extend credit than they otherwise would have.129 Loan originators with 
no intent to retain long term the payment streams associated with a lending agree-
ment face little incentive to optimize default risks and every incentive to obfus-
cate those risks to assignees and ultimately to the capital markets likely to pur-
chase securitized loan products. Over-lending is the result. 
2. Predatory Practices, Cognitive Biases, and Price Discrimination 
Even where the lender (or loan originator) retains the loan as an asset on its 
books and records, over-lending may result where lenders expect to earn a profit 
although specializing in high-risk lending. Behavioral decision research130 pre-
dicts that subprime lenders may design fringe products that offset higher than 
average default risks with higher than average interest income.131 So does re-
search on the financial illiteracy of consumer borrowers.132 Payday lenders, cred-
itors relying on a borrower’s nonpurchase-money assignment of the title to their 
car as security, and other high-risk, short-term extensions of consumer credit 
charge exceedingly high interest rates: payday loans, for example, often bear An-
nual Percentage Rates (“APR”) in excess of 500%.133 Other short-term fringe 
lenders have been documented as charging something more like 36% APR.134 
 
 129. Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 53, at 471. 
 130.  Behavioral decision research (BDR) suggests that consumers may systematically underestimate the 
likelihood of future borrowing, and overestimate their ability to repay outstanding loans, as a result of hyper-
discounting, over-optimism, and framing biases. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCTION BY CONTRACT: LAW, 
ECONOMICS AND PSYCHOLOGY IN CONSUMER MARKETS 121 (2012); Lawrence Ausubel, The Failure of Compe-
tition in the Credit Card Market, 81 AM. ECON. REV. 50, 71 (1991); Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 122, at 
1537–38. For a rebuttal of the implications of BDR for consumer credit markets, including an effort to collect 
contrary empirical findings, see THOMAS DURKIN, GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, MICHAEL E. STATEN & TODD 
ZYWICKI, CONSUMER CREDIT AND THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 439–44 (2014). 
 131. See, e.g., Ronald J. Mann, Bankruptcy Reform and the “Sweat Box” of Credit Card Debt, 2007 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 375, 384–85 (2007) (describing “the sweat box of credit card debt” as the result of a data-driven, highly 
competitive market in which “[t]he successful credit card lender profits from the borrowers who become finan-
cially distressed”). 
 132.  See, e.g., STEPHEN REDER & JOHN BYNNER, TRACKING ADULT LITERACY AND NUMERACY SKILLS: 
FINDINGS FROM LONGITUDINAL RESEARCH (2009); Tullio Jappelli & Mario Padula, Investment in Financial Lit-
eracy and Saving Decisions, (Ctr. for Studies in Econ. & Fin., Working Paper No. 272, 2012) (on file with 
University of Illinois Law Review). For discussion of the diverse definitions of financial literacy, see David L. 
Remund, Financial Literacy Explicated: The Case for a Clearer Definition in an Increasingly Complex Economy, 
44 J. CONSUMER AFF. 276, 278 (2010). 
 133. Megan Leonhardt, This Map Shows the States Where Payday Loans Charge Nearly 700 Percent Inter-
est, CNBC (Aug. 3, 2018, 11:27 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/08/03/states-with-the-highest-payday-loan-
rates.html. 
 134.  For discussion of the findings of extensive empirical study of payday lending and related fringe lending 
markets, see CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU, SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS ON PAYDAY, PAYDAY 
INSTALLMENT, AND VEHICLE TITLE LOANS, AND DEPOSIT ADVANCE PRODUCTS (2016). On the basis of these 
findings, the CFPB issued a rule to regulate these markets. Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain High-Cost Install-
ment Loans, 82 Fed. Reg. 54,472 (Nov. 17, 2017) (codified at 12 C.F.R. 1041) [hereinafter Payday Rule]. On 
February 6, 2019, the CFPB issued two proposed rules relating to the Payday Rule. One would rescind certain 
underwriting provisions in the Rule, see 84 Fed. Reg. 4252 (Feb. 14, 2019), while the other would delay the 
Rule’s compliance deadline by a year and several months so that it extends beyond the Presidential election 
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In addition to profiting from higher than expected interest rates, payday 
lenders and other consumer lenders, including mainstream credit card issuers, 
generate substantial noninterest income.135 Examples include annual fees for 
holding a credit card, as well as other fees that consumers are less likely to view 
as salient terms to their lending agreement136—the so-called “tricks and traps” 
now-Senator Elizabeth Warren and her co-author Oren Bar-Gill identified as jus-
tifying creation of an independent administrative agency governing issues of 
consumer financial protection.137 Lenders may have incentives to obfuscate these 
terms.138 When obscured terms take the form of late fees, overdraft fees, default 
interest rates and the like, lenders not only look to profit from this noninterest 
income; they look to profit from their borrowers’ default in what Ronald Mann 
has termed the “sweat box” of consumer credit.139 Credit extended through this 
“sweat box” model is most directly connected to concerns about over-indebted-
ness, especially where measures of over-indebtedness consider consumer bor-
rowers’ self-identified discomfort with debt levels.140 Debt constructed to result 
in noninterest income from default fees often causes psychological stress to bor-
rowers precisely because it was not anticipated. 
3. Moral Hazard 
Finally, protections enshrined in bankruptcy laws may encourage consumer 
lenders to overextend credit in specific markets. Where domestic law permits the 
discharge in bankruptcy of most types of debt, but makes exceptions for some 
types of indebtedness, lenders have incentives to extend the statutorily favored 
types of credit. Household credit secured by an individual borrower’s primary 
residence is not subject to modification in a United States chapter 13 debt repay-
ment plan;141 nor are many car loans incurred by individual debtors within 910 
 
results of 2020. See 84 Fed. Reg. 4298 (Feb. 14, 2019) (extending compliance deadline from August 18, 2019 to 
November 19, 2020). 
 135.  Block-Lieb & Janger, supra note 53, at 467 
 136.  See, e.g., Mann, supra note131, at 382–94 (distinguishing “transaction based” credit card issuers, who 
“attempt to maximize the number of cardholders that use their cards frequently for high-value purchases,” and 
“debt based” issuers, who “attempt to maximize the number of customers who do not repay their account balances 
in full each month” and recognizing that the latter type counter-intuitively seek out borrowers more likely to 
repay while in default). 
 137. Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PENN. L. REV. 1, 6 (2008). Dodd-
Frank, Title X, created the CFPB in the wake of the financial crisis. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Con-
sumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank]. That Sen. Christo-
pher Dodd and Cong. Barney Frank were inspired to do so by Warren and Bar-Gill’s scholarship is no secret. 
See, e.g., Leonard J. Kennedy et al., The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau: Financial Regulation for The 
Twenty-First Century, 97 CORNELL L. REV. 1141, 1146 n.14 (2012). 
 138. See, e.g., Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information 
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 Q. J. ECON. 505, 505–07 (2006) (arguing that competitive firms exploit 
myopic consumers through marketing schemes that shroud high-priced add-ons, and that sophisticated consumers 
exploit these marketing schemes to the long-term detriment of those less-sophisticated buyers and borrowers). 
 139.  Mann, supra note 131, at 384–92. 
 140. Id. at 385. 
 141.  11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (2018). 
  
No. 5] ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES IN SOVEREIGN DEBT MARKETS 1611 
days of filing.142 Student loan debt is nondischargeable under U.S. bankruptcy 
law, unless it is shown to inflict undue hardship on the borrower, a term of art 
mostly requiring individuals to endure years of struggle.143 Some have argued, 
for example, that a brewing crisis in student loan debt markets is in part the con-
sequence of incentives for over-lending created by United States bankruptcy 
laws.144 
B. Consumer Finance Regulation 
As noted earlier, an important distinction between sovereign and consumer 
lending markets is that the latter are highly regulated. Mostly, this regulation 
exists at the national rather than international level. Lending and the problems 
associated with consumer over-indebtedness, however, increasingly reach across 
national borders.145 As a consequence, national regulators invest in regional and 
international efforts to coordinate financial consumer protection regimes. Partic-
ularly since the G-20’s adoption of High Level Principles on Financial Consumer 
Protection in 2011, 146 regulation of lenders in the market for household credit 
has expanded along an emerging consensus (1) on the importance of financial 
consumer protection regulations, including both mandatory and standardized dis-
closure regulation and “responsible lending” regulation, (2) on initiatives to ed-
ucate and counsel consumer borrowers on the complicated options available to 
them, and (3) on the consequences of choices in institutional design.147 
 
 142.  11 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(9) (2018) (often referred to as the “hanging paragraph” in section 1325). 
 143.  11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8) (2018). For several empirical studies of courts’ disparate application of this 
“undue hardship” standard, see Jason Iuliano, An Empirical Assessment of Student Loan Discharges and the 
Undue Hardship Standard, 86 AM. BANKR. L.J. 495 (2012); Rafael I. Pardo, Illness and Inability to Repay: The 
Role of Debtor Health in the Discharge of Educational Debt, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 505, 505 (2008); Rafael I. 
Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, The Real Student-Loan Scandal: Undue Hardship Discharge Litigation, 83 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 179, 180 (2009); Rafael I. Pardo & Michelle R. Lacey, Undue Hardship in the Bankruptcy Courts: 
An Empirical Assessment of the Discharge of Educational Debt, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 405, 405 (2005). 
 144. See, e.g., Helaine Olen, One Way to Tackle the Student Loan Debt Crisis: Bankruptcy Court, 
WASHINGTON POST (May 15, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2019/05/15/one-way-tackle-stu-
dent-loan-crisis-bankruptcy-court/ (noting that student loan debt ballooned after Bankruptcy Code was amended 
in 2005 to expand limits on discharge of such debt in bankruptcy); Adam Looney & Constantine Yannelis, A 
Crisis in Student Loans? How Changes in the Characteristics of Borrowers and in the Institutions They Attended 
Contributed to Rising Loan Defaults, (Brookings Papers on Econ. Activity, Fall 2015), https://www.brook-
ings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/09/LooneyTextFall15BPEA.pdf (describing student loan debt outstanding at 
historically high levels–more than $1 trillion–and with historically high default rates–and increasingly owed to 
“non-traditional” educational institutions–for-profit and trade schools). 
 145. RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 19, at 6; see also, e.g., Organization for Economic Co-operation 
and Development [OECD], National Accounts at a Glance 2015, at 49 (2015), https://read.oecd-ilibrary.org/eco-
nomics/national-accounts-at-a-glance-2015_na_glance-2015-en#page1 (collating data on household debt as a 
percentage of disposable income across 28 countries); CIVIC CONSULTING, The Over-Indebtedness of European 
Households: Updated Mapping of The Situation, Nature and Causes, Effects and Initiatives for Alleviating Its 
Impact (Dec. 2013), https://ec.europa.eu/info/sites/info/files/final-report-on-over-indebtedness-of-european-
households-synthesis-of-findings_december2013_en.pdf. 
 146.  See G-20 HLP on FCP, supra note 20. 
 147.  Id. at 7; see also RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 19, at 13. 
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We put aside for purposes of this paper discussion of financial disclosure 
and financial literacy education initiatives, which probably are better termed re-
sponsible borrowing regulations. We concentrate instead on the regulation of re-
sponsible lending.148 Moreover, while the term “responsible lending regulation” 
might be applied to a wide range of regulation in markets for consumer loans, 
we mostly exclude discussion of disclosure mandates as well as prohibitions on 
unfair lending practices and unfair provisions in lending agreements. 
Our exclusion of these regulations is not because countries disagree on their 
wisdom.149 Indeed, there is increasingly broad convergence in this context. 
United States legislation has proscribed consumer lenders’ “unfair and deceptive 
practices” for nearly eighty years.150 And for almost fifty years, the United States 
has mandated standardized disclosures for nearly all consumer-lending products 
and at multiple stages in the relationship between consumer borrowers and their 
 
 148.  Our focus on responsible lending regulation in consumer credit markets is motivated by correlative 
proposals, or at least correlative labeling of proposals, pertaining to sovereign lending. This is not to say that 
responsible sovereign lending proposals have not also urged enhanced disclosure—they have—but the parallels 
between disclosure mandates in the two markets are more attenuated and we leave this issue for another time. 
 149.  If there is lack of consensus in consumer finance regulation it is on the question of whether regulation 
should concentrate on delimiting certain contract terms deemed by regulators to be unfair, or whether such reg-
ulation should focus on providing disclosure mandates and imposing limits on unfair and deceptive practices. 
See, e.g., THOMAS A. DURKIN & GREGORY ELLIEHAUSEN, TRUTH IN LENDING: THEORY, HISTORY, AND A WAY 
FORWARD 20 (2011) (describing consumer financial protection regulation in the US as consisting “predomi-
nately” of disclosure mandates). U.S. law on unfair contract terms has been limited to specific sorts of credit 
agreements, such as credit card agreements, with the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure 
(CARD) Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, §102(a)(5)(B), 123 Stat. 1739 (2009), and residential mortgage agree-
ments, with Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), 124 Stat. 2005 (2010), and thus 
is more recent than other sorts of consumer financial protection regulation. Terms regulation in this context 
mostly emanates out of Europe. The European Council’s Directive on Unfair Contract Terms, EC Directive 
93/13/EEC, dates from 1993 and predates its other directives on consumer credit and consumer contracting. See 
Council Directive 93/13, 1993, O.J. (L 95) 29, 31 (EC). 
 150. Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act has since 1914 granted the FTC the power to prevent 
unfair methods of competition; in 1938, the Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the FTCA expanded this grant to em-
power the Commission also to regulate “unfair and deceptive acts or practices” in commerce, although not as to 
financial institutions who were subject to similar limits but these were only enforceable by distinct financial 
services regulators. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2018). Perhaps because courts construed Section 5 of the FTCA not to grant 
“private right of action,” numerous states have adopted Little FTC Acts or other statutes prohibiting “unfair and 
deceptive practices” and mostly granting individuals to right to bring suit on the basis of violations of these state 
laws. For discussion of state UDAP laws, see generally Carolyn L. Carter, Consumer Protection in the States: A 
50-State Report on Unfair and Deceptive Acts and Practices Statutes, (Nat’l Consumer L. Ctr., Feb. 2009), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/udap/report_50_states.pdf. Dodd-Frank similarly granted the CFPB the power 
to prevent “unfair, deceptive or abusive acts or practices” pertaining to “covered persons” within the CFPB’s 
jurisdiction over consumer finance and related services. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protec-
tion, § 1031. 
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lenders.151 European consumer protection law similarly prohibits unfair, mis-
leading, and aggressive practices,152 and mandates disclosure of key credit 
terms.153 
Instead, we view discussion of unfair consumer lending practices and unfair 
terms in consumer contracts as largely outside the scope of this paper because 
proposals for responsible sovereign lending regulation have been largely silent 
on this front. To be sure, some sovereign borrowers arguably commit to repay-
ment or other terms they do not fully understand: the currency swap arranged for 
Greece by Goldman Sachs may be an example, at least if one accepts the account 
of that transaction offered by Greek officials.154 Yet relatively few observers 
worry that sovereign lending agreements contain predatory contract terms to the 
extent complained of in the consumer context.155 Nor has the same degree of 
attention been paid to allegations of deceptive or misleading marketing or other 
sales practices in the market for sovereign loans.156 Moreover, we put to one side 
most conversation about disclosure mandates, since the justification for manda-
tory disclosure in consumer lending contexts differs considerably from the case 
for enhanced disclosure in sovereign lending. 
We focus in the next section, narrowly, on laws obliging lenders to assess 
consumers’ creditworthiness and, in some cases, to undertake fiduciary-like du-
ties to assess the propriety of credit products offered to consumers. We term these 
obligations “responsible lending” regulations. We return in the section that fol-
lows to differentiate responsible consumer lending regulation from other sorts of 
consumer finance regulation, mostly to emphasize the frequent connections be-
tween the two. 
C. Responsible Lending Regulation in Consumer Credit 
Although there are no internationally recognized standards on responsible 
consumer lending,157 there is broad consensus that responsible lending regula-
tion should govern consumer debt markets, in some form and to some degree.158 
 
 151.  See Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (2018) (originally enacted as Title I of the Consumer 
Credit Protection Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968)). For discussion of TILA as “the center-
piece of federal consumer protection efforts in the credit area,” see DURKIN & ELLIEHAUSEN, supra note 149, at 
82. 
 152.  See EU Council Directive 2005/29, Concerning Unfair Business-to-Consumer Commercial Practices 
in the Internal Market, 2005 O.J. (L 149) 22, 24 (EC). See also EU Council Directive 2006/114, Concerning 
Misleading and Comparative Advertising 2006, O.J. (L 376) 21, 22 (EC). 
 153.  See EU Council Directive 2008/48, Concerning the Credit Agreement for Consumers, 2008, O.J. (L 
133) 66, 68 (EC). 
 154.  See supra Subsection III.A.6. 
 155.  See Gelpern, supra note 108, at 353 (“From the perspective of the regulators, sovereign debt markets 
are generally the province of sophisticated issuers and investors, who need little by way of consumer protec-
tion.”). 
 156. Id. 
 157. RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 19, at 13. 
 158.  See, e.g., G-20 HLP on CFP, supra note 20, at 4; RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 19, at 13; see also 
EUROPEAN COMMISSION, PUBLIC CONSULTATION ON RESPONSIBLE LENDING AND BORROWING IN THE EU 3 
(2009) (defining responsible lending as ensuring that “credit products are appropriate for consumers’ needs and 
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The World Bank reports responsible lending regulation in place in eighty coun-
tries, with forty of these countries imposing lending limits such as loan to value 
or debt service ratios.159 It also notes that many countries combine mandatory 
disclosure regulation with additional regulation of business practices, including 
assessment of consumers’ financial capability or creditworthiness.160 This agree-
ment on the need for responsible lending regulation in consumer lending mar-
kets, however, has not produced agreement on the contours this regulation should 
take. 
1. Ability to Repay and Related Regulation 
One common means for regulating responsible consumer lending involves 
the imposition of “ability to pay” requirements, generally in the form of require-
ments to verify a consumer borrower’s income, credit history or other indicia of 
creditworthiness.161 
Ideally, the test of a loan’s affordability should consider the borrower’s 
ability to repay a debt in full rather than simply the borrower’s ability to service 
the loan.162 On this question, however, international aspirations and national 
practices differ. In the United States, for example, consumer finance regulation 
mandates consideration of a consumer borrower’s ability to repay a residential 
mortgage in full,163 but only requires credit card issuers to consider a credit card 
holder’s ability to make monthly payments.164 It is an open question whether 
these differences will persist. 
 
are tailored to their ability to repay,” noting that the EU Consumer Credit Directive, Directive 2008/48/EC of the 
European Parliament and Council (23 April 2008), creates incentives for covered financial institutions to lend 
responsibly, but conceding that there may remain “significant room for irresponsible lending and borrowing to 
take place”). 
 159.  RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 19, at 11. 
 160.  Id. at 13. 
 161.  Id. at 32 (“Some governments prescribe the minimum information lenders must collect from customers 
to ensure comparability and allow for verification of borrower’s creditworthiness.”). 
 162.  Id. at 35. In theory, there should be no distinction between the operation of the two standards, since if 
a borrower is able to meet periodic payment obligations she should be able to repay the debt obligation in full 
and on time. To the extent there is a distinction between the two, a borrower’s ability to repay the outstanding 
debt would seem to be the more relevant aim of such a regulatory inquiry. Arguably an ability to repay test is 
more difficult to comply with as applied to a revolving loan, however, given uncertainties pertaining to variability 
in the length of time the borrower may take to repay the non-term loan in full. The distinction between a term 
and revolving loan is not always clear, however. Consider, for example, certain residential mortgage obligations 
and certain short-term installment loans, which are framed as term loans but may instead operate more as a 
revolving loan in practice given lenders’ assumptions regarding the borrower’s likelihood of refinancing. 
 163. 15 U.S.C. § 1639(c)(A)(1) (2018). This provision was added in 2010 by Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank 
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376. Consistent with a con-
gressional mandate set out in this statutory provision, the CFPB has promulgated regulations implementing and 
explicated this “ability to repay” standard. See Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the 
Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 78 Fed. Reg. 35,430 (June 12, 2013) (codified at 12 C.F.R. pt. 1026). (Jan. 
30, 2013) (promulgating final regulation, effective Jan. 10, 2014). For scholarly commentary on this “ability to 
repay” standard and significance for consumer financial protection regulation more generally, see generally John 
Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 175 (2011). 
 164.  15 U.S.C. § 1665e (2018). This provision was added in 2009 by the Credit Card Accountability Re-
sponsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act of 2009), Pub. L. No. 111-24 (2009), § 109, 124 Stat. 1734 
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American regulation of responsible lending in the market for small loans is 
especially in flux. Numerous states either prohibit, prescribe, or require the li-
censure165 of payday lenders,166 and this state regulation varies considerably. 
Payday lenders and other similar small loan providers are subject to mandatory 
disclosure regulation as a matter of federal law but, for the moment, little else.167 
The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau finalized a regulation requiring as-
sessment of consumer borrower’s ability to repay payday and other short term 
loans,168 and also contains “safe harbors from the Rule’s ability-to-repay require-
ments that are keyed to price or [a] longer repayment term.”169 Although the 
CFPB’s Payday Rule was finalized, and although Congress did not reverse this 
regulation,170 its future remains unclear.171 
 
(“A card issuer may not open any credit card account for any consumer under an open end consumer credit plan, 
or increase any credit limit applicable to such account, unless the card issuer considers the ability of the consumer 
to make the required payments under the terms of such account.”). The CFPB has twice amended Regulation Z 
to implement this statutory provision. For the most recent such amendment, see 12 C.F.R. § 1026.51 (2013). 
 165.  There is enormous variation in state law surrounding payday lending. For 50-state surveys of these 
laws, see, for example, PEW, State Payday Loan Regulation and Usage Rates, (Jan. 14, 2014), http://www.pew 
trusts.org/en/multimedia/data-visualizations/2014/state-payday-loan-regulation-and-usage-rates; NATIONAL 
CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, Payday Lending State Statutes (Sept. 6, 2016), http://www.ncsl.org/re-
search/financial-services-and-commerce/payday-lending-state-statutes.aspx.   
 166.  The CFPB finalized its federal regulation of payday and other short-term lending. For discussion of 
current status of this Payday Rule, see Payday Rule, supra note 134. 
 167.  For discussion of additional federal regulation to which federal banks engaging in payday lending are 
subject, see Financial Institution Letters: Guidelines for Payday Lending, FED. DEPOSIT INS. CORP., https://www. 
fdic.gov/news/news/financial/2005/fil1405a.html (last revised Nov. 2015) (noting that its Guidance is “necessi-
tated by the high risk nature of payday lending and the substantial growth of this product” but also that the 
Guidance is only applicable to financial institutions subject to its regulatory jurisdiction). 
 168.  An important part of the final Payday Rule is its incorporation of an “ability to repay” standard to 
regulate this sort of lending. See CFPB, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Payday, Vehicle Title, and Certain 
High-Cost Installment Loans, 84 Fed. Reg. 4252 (noting that the Bureau proposes rescinding the ability to repay 
determination requirements proposed for certain high-coat installment loans). For discussion of the regulatory 
history of the Payday Rule and its current uncertainties, see Payday Rule, supra note 134. 
 169. Adam Levitin, OCC Payday Lending Bulletin, CREDIT SLIPS (May 24, 2018), https://www.cred-
itslips.org/creditslips/2018/05/occ-payday-lending-bulletin.html (comparing CFPB’s Final Payday Rule with a 
recent Bulletin issued by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the same topic); see also Core Lending 
Principles for Short-Term, Small-Dollar Installment Lending, OCC BULL. 2018-14 (Office of the Comptroller of 
the Currency, Washington D.C.) (May 23, 2018), https://www.occ.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2018/bulletin-
2018-14.html (providing that “responsible short-term, small-dollar installment loans” should follow “sound risk 
management practices” and strategies, which “could include working with consumers who have an ability to 
repay a loan despite a credit profile that is outside a bank’s typical underwriting standards for credit scores and 
repayment ratios”). 
 170. Legislation was introduced to reverse the Final Payday Rule under the Congressional Review Act of 
1996, 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (1996); see H.R.J. Res. 122, 115th Cong. (2017). This bill, however, did not secure 
the needed votes. 
 171.  In February 2019, the CFPB proposed a “reconsideration” of the ability to pay standard in the Payday 
Rule and to “address the rule’s compliance date.” For discussion of this regulatory history, see Payday Rule supra 
note 134. Moreover, two trade groups have brought suit against the CFPB in a Texas district court challenging 
the Final Payday Rule as unlawful. See Alan S. Kaplinsky, A Third Bite at the Apple: Trade Groups File Lawsuit 
Challenging CFPB Payday Rule, JDSUPRA: CONSUMER FIN. MONITOR (Apr. 11, 2018), https://www.jdsupra. 
com/legalnews/a-third-bite-at-the-apple-trade-groups-17707/ (describing complaint filed in Consumer Financial 
Service Assoc. of American, Ltd., et al, v. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau). 
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Regardless of whether consumer financial protection regulations require 
assessment of a consumer’s ability to repay a loan in full or simply to continue 
to make periodic payments, these sorts of responsible lending regulations also 
differ in form. Some responsible consumer lending regulations specify regula-
tory goals in broad terms, such as the mandate in Art. 8 of the EU Consumer 
Credit Directive to ensure that creditors “assess the consumer’s creditworthiness 
on the basis of sufficient information.”172 Other responsible lending regulations 
prescribe specific business practices or contractual terms. For example, a number 
of countries require lenders to keep within specified debt limits or debt ratios, 
such as debt-to-income or loan-to-value ratios.173 Others, like in the United 
States, combine the two by overlapping an open-ended standard that requires 
lenders to determine a consumer borrower’s ability to repay174 together with a 
safe harbor for compliance with specified underwriting practices, such as income 
verification, and in limited circumstances the presence or absence of particular 
contractual terms.175 
Regulation of responsible consumer lending, thus, mandates a lender’s as-
sessment of a consumer borrower’s “ability to pay” or repay. It is directed at the 
lender’s underwriting (or loan approval) practices, and not at its marketing or 
other lending practices, and not at the provisions or terms of the loan itself.176 
 
 172.  Council Directive 2008/48/EC, of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 April 2008 on 
Credit Agreements for Consumers and Repealing Council Directive 87/102/EEC, art. 8(1), 2008 O.J. (L 133) 66, 
82 (providing that “[m]ember States shall ensure that, before the conclusion of the credit agreement, the creditor 
assesses the consumer’s creditworthiness on the basis of sufficient information, where appropriate obtained from 
the consumer and, where necessary, on the basis of consultation of the relevant database . . . .”). For a report on 
implementation under this Directive, see Framework Contract on Evaluation, Impact Assessment and Related 
Services: Study on the Impact of the Legal Choices of the Member States and other Aspects of Implementing the 
Directive 2008/48/EC on the Functioning of the Consumer Credit Market in the European Union, RISK & POLICY 
ANALYSTS LTD. 7 (Oct. 2013), https://rpaltd.co.uk/uploads/report_files/j812-study-on-impact-of-the-legal-
choices-en.pdf. 
 173.  RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 19, at 45–46 (referring to specific examples). 
 174.  Dodd-Frank, supra note 137, at tit. XIV, §§ 1411 & 1412. Sections 1411 and 1412 of Dodd-Frank 
generally require creditors to make “a reasonable, good faith determination of a consumer’s ability to repay any 
consumer credit transaction secured by a dwelling” (although excluding open-end credit plans, timeshare plans, 
reverse mortgages and temporary loans) and set out “certain protections from liability under this requirement for 
qualified mortgages.” They also grant jurisdiction to the CFPB to adopt regulations implementing these provi-
sions, which it has exercised. Ability to Repay Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 
CONSUMER FIN. PROTECTION BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/rulemaking/rules-
under-development/ability-repay-standards-under-truth-lending-act-regulation-z/ (last visited Aug. 5, 2019). 
 175.  The CFPB’s Final Qualified Mortgage Regulation (generally referred to as its QM Reg) was published 
as the Ability-to-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Standards Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z). See 
supra note 163. The CFPB revised the scope of this rule to reflect distinct practices, for example, in certain rural 
markets, and recently published a report to assess overall practice experiences under the QM Reg.  See CFPB, 
Ability-To-Repay and Qualified Mortgage Rule Assessment Report (Jan. 2019), https://files.consumer 
finance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_ability-to-repay-qualified-mortgage_assessment-report.pdf. It has also signaled 
its intention to allow certain aspects of the QM Reg to lapse after expiration of a sunset provision. See CFPB, 
Qualified Mortgage Definition Under the Truth in Lending Act (Regulation Z), 84 Fed. Reg. 37,155 (July 31, 
2019), https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2019/07/31/2019-16298/qualified-mortgage-definition-un-
der-the-truth-in-lending-act-regulation-z. 
 176.  For example, the CFPB describes its QM Regulation in this way: 
The final rule describes certain minimum requirements for creditors making ability to repay determinations, 
but does not dictate that they follow particular underwriting models. At a minimum, creditors generally 
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Efforts to specify satisfaction of open-ended underwriting standards may, espe-
cially in the United States, get entwined with regulation that differentiates be-
tween different credit products. The safe harbors set out in these regulations in-
directly favor inclusion of certain contract terms over others, mostly as relates to 
“high-cost mortgages”177 and “high-cost installment loans,” including short-
term, small-dollar payday loans.178 
2. Regulation of Loan Suitability 
While the World Bank reports convergence on consumer financial protec-
tion regulation requiring lenders to assess a borrower’s “ability to repay,” coun-
tries such as the United Kingdom provide another layer of protection by requiring 
consumer lenders also to assess the suitability of a consumer debt obligation to 
the borrower’s situation.179 Suitability requirements are commonplace in regula-
tion of consumer investment decisions under both United States and European 
Union law. The United Kingdom has extended these suitability requirements to 
financial decision-making on debt, as well.180 While some academics argued that 
a suitability standard should apply both to stock and mortgage brokers,181 the 
United States explicitly rejected this approach under the Dodd-Frank Act.182 
Suitability standards impose fiduciary or near-fiduciary obligations of ad-
vice to consumer borrowers. Historically, however, debtor-creditor relationships 
between borrowers and lenders have not been construed to create fiduciary obli-
gations to act in the borrower’s best interest.183 The strongest case for fiduciary 
obligations to assess the suitability of consumer credit may extend to financial 
intermediaries in the household loan markets, such as mortgage brokers, since 
brokers often hold such obligations in other contexts. 
 
must consider eight underwriting factors: (1) Current or reasonably expected income or assets; (2) current 
employment status; (3) the monthly payment on the covered transaction; (4) the monthly payment on any 
simultaneous loan; (5) the monthly payment for mortgage-related obligations; (6) current debt obligations, 
alimony, and child support; (7) the monthly debt-to-income ratio or residual income; and (8) credit history. 
Id. at 35, 438–39. 
 177. See generally id. 
 178.  See, e.g., Payday Rule, supra note 134, at 54,472. 
 179.  RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 29, at 40–43 (describing suitability test as relating to three factors: 
assessment of the consumer’s best interests; her understanding of the product; and the long-term affordability of 
the loan). 
 180.  Id. at 41–42. 
 181.  Jonathan R. Macey et al., Helping Law Catch Up to Markets: Applying Broker-Dealer Law to Sub-
prime Mortgages, 34 J. CORP. L. 789, 814–37 (2009). 
 182.  Although something like a suitability standard was contained in a pre-cursor to the Dodd-Frank Act 
passed by the US House of Representatives, the Senate rejected this approach. See Block-Lieb & Janger, supra 
note 53, at 493 (discussing this legislative history). 
 183. See generally Warren L. Dennis & Mark Masling, Death Knell for Fiduciary Duties of Lenders to 
Consumer Borrowers, 46 BUS. LAW. 1223 (1991). 
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3. Lack of Consensus on Details, or Overarching Goals? 
Responsible consumer lending regulation looks to prevent, or at least curb, 
consumer over-indebtedness.184 By mandating that lenders use sound underwrit-
ing practices for assessing a consumer’s creditworthiness or “ability to repay,” 
responsible lending regulation presumes that market forces alone do not deter 
“irresponsible” lending. Policymakers justify this presumption with references 
to rational lenders’ incentives to lend excessively—that is, the agency problems, 
cognitive biases, price discrimination, and moral hazard referred to above.185 
But responsible lending regulation is not the only means through which 
regulators have addressed problems of consumer over-indebtedness. Consumer 
finance regulation also tackles problems of information asymmetries and cogni-
tive biases through disclosure mandates and financial education initiatives, 
agency problems and predatory practices through regulation of unfair and mis-
leading marketing and lending practices, and moral hazard through regulation of 
the price and nonprice terms in consumer finance contracts.186 A failure to con-
verge on the contours of the sorts of lending regulations described above is partly 
related to distinctions in the broad range of consumer financial transactions avail-
able in the marketplace, partly a function of regulatory tastes and preferences, 
but also in important ways a signal of a more foundational disagreement on the 
underlying purposes for layering responsible lending regulation on top of other 
consumer financial protection regulation. 
For example, under United States law, an “ability to pay” standard governs 
extensions of credit card credit.187 A related “ability to repay” standard governs 
residential mortgage markets188 and possibly certain short-term revolving exten-
sions of credit, such as payday loans. 189 Although the “ability to pay” require-
ment for responsible lending in United States credit card markets is not clarified 
 
 184.  RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 19, at 12 (overviewing regulatory tools). 
 185. See Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), 124 Stat. 2005 (2010); supra 
Section III.A. 
 186.  See supra Subsection III.A.4–5. 
 187.  CARD Act, supra note 164, at 123 Stat. at 1743. 
 188. Title XIV of the Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1031(a), 124 Stat. 2005 (2010). For discus-
sion of the regulatory history that followed enactment of this provision, see supra note 163. 
 189.  Payday Rule, supra note 134, at 54,472. 
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by an explicit “safe harbor,” 190 the “ability to repay” standards applicable to res-
idential mortgage191 and certain payday and other small amount, short term lend-
ing are coupled with “safe harbor” provisions to clarify when a lender has satis-
fied these open-ended standards for responsible lending.192 
The details of these safe harbor provisions are best understood in light of 
other United States consumer finance regulation, which mostly does not regulate 
the price terms in consumer credit transactions and only recently looks to regu-
late the nonprice terms (that is, the contract provisions) in specific consumer 
credit transactions. Thus, while the high interest rates charged by certain sub-
prime lenders are not directly regulated, Dodd-Frank and the QM Regulations 
promulgated pursuant to Dodd-Frank establish safe harbors that are harder to 
satisfy in the case of “high-cost mortgages.”193 Similarly, while currently the 
CFPB’s regulation of payday and other small amount, short-term lending does 
not impose caps on interest rates and related fees, it would more harshly regulate 
shorter-term (and so, likely higher-cost) loans. The result is to create regulatory 
incentives for extending small loans over a longer two-year period at a lower 
36% APR.194 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
If there is no consensus as to the form or objectives of consumer lending 
regulation, neither is there consensus in the context of sovereign debt. With sov-
ereign lending markets, regulatory debates take place in the shadow of two im-
portant limitations. First, because borrowers are sovereign governments, they are 
immune from coercive regulation.195 Second, regulatory actors have shown little 
appetite for policing the conduct of the global banks and financial intermediaries 
that dominate the market for sovereign debt.196 Nevertheless, consumer lending 
 
 190.  See, e.g., CARD Act, supra note 164; see also Obrea O. Poindexter & Matthew W. Janiga, The CFPB 
Amends Regulation Z’s Credit Card Issuer “Ability-to-Pay” Requirement, 69 BUS. LAWYER 593, 596 (2014). 
Increasingly, US credit card regulation prohibits credit card issuers from relying on specific terms in credit card 
agreements (such as universal default clauses or clauses permitting modification of credit card credit agreements 
with little notice although the card holder is not otherwise in default). Although Regulation Z provides a sort of 
safe harbor for the “ability to pay” requirements applicable to credit card lending, it is not very detailed. CARD 
Act, supra note 164. 
 191. Adam Levitin has summarized the safe harbors in the QM Regulation as follows: 
QM is defined as a mortgage that meets the following six criteria: 1. regular payments that are substantially 
equal (ARMs and step-rate mortgages excepted) and always positively amortizing; 2. term ≤30 years; 3. 
[with] limited fees/points (caps vary with mortgage size); 4. [that was] underwritten using the maximum 
interest rate in the first five years to ensure repayment; 5. income verified; [with] backend DTI ≤43% (in-
cluding simultaneous loans). 
Levitin, supra note 169. 
 192.  For discussion of the safe harbors set out the CFPB’s Payday Rule, see id. Whether the ability to repay 
portions of the Payday Rule will survive remains an open question.  For discussion of this regulatory history, see 
Payday Rule, supra note 134. 
 193.  See Dodd-Frank, supra note 137; supra note 163. 
 194.  See Payday Rule, supra note 134, at 54,485. 
 195. See Panizza, supra note 6, at 3. 
 196. See Adam Feibelman, The IMF and Regulation of Cross-Border Capital Flows, 15 CHI. J. INT’L L. 
409, 431, 431 n.125 (2015). 
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regulation offers lessons for the sovereign debt markets. We address two such 
lessons in this Part. The first involves assessments of debt sustainability. The 
second implicates debates about the roles and responsibilities of lenders to sov-
ereign borrowers. 
A. Defining and Assessing Sustainability 
Sovereign debt sustainability assessments are most commonly associated 
with the practices of the IMF, which primarily assesses sustainability in two set-
tings.197 The IMF regularly monitors the economic and financial policies of 
member states in an activity known as surveillance.198 This includes periodic 
analysis of debt sustainability, for which the fund has separate methodologies for 
low-income countries (i.e., those that depend heavily on concessional financing) 
and market-access countries (those with consistent access to capital markets).199 
From the IMF’s perspective, debt sustainability means that “the primary balance 
needed to at least stabilize debt . . . is economically and politically feasible, such 
that the level of debt is consistent with an acceptably low rollover risk and with 
preserving potential growth at a satisfactory level.”200 The assessment of sover-
eign debt sustainability, thus, focuses on whether the borrower has sufficiently 
robust political institutions and economic prospects to tax or grow to the extent 
needed to maintain debt service.201 
In addition to regular monitoring, some IMF lending decisions also require 
assessments of sustainability. This includes the Exceptional Access Framework, 
which grants member states access to financing above normal access limits, typ-
ically in the context of a debt crisis.202 When a member state has lost access to 
 
 197.  The IMF was created to address the instability in monetary and exchange rate policies that contributed 
to the Second World War. See id. at 426. 
 198.  See Articles of Agreement of the IMF, art. IV, § 3(a); Feibelman, supra note 196, at 426–29 (describing 
the scope of IMF authority). 
 199.  IMF, Debt Sustainability Analysis: Introduction (last updated July 29, 2017), http://www.imf.org/ex-
ternal/pubs/ft/dsa/. 
 200.  IMF, Staff Guidance Note for Public Debt Sustainability Analysis in Market-Access Countries (May 
9, 2013), http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/050913.pdf. Thus, debt is unsustainable when “a debt re-
structuring is already needed (or expected to be needed),” when a government accumulates debt “faster than its 
capacity to service these debts is growing,” and when debt levels increase although “major retrenchment will be 
needed to service these debts.” IMF, Assessing Sustainability at 4 (May 28, 2002), http://www.imf.org/exter-
nal/np/pdr/sus/2002/eng/052802.pdf. 
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market financing, the IMF often acts as lender of last resort, albeit one with im-
portant resource constraints.203 This role requires special attention to safeguard-
ing Fund resources.204 Until recently, IMF policy conditioned access to emer-
gency loans on a finding that a member’s debt load was sustainable with high 
probability in the medium term.205 The lack of such a finding effectively condi-
tioned Fund support on a debt restructuring deep enough to bring the borrower’s 
debt to sustainable levels.206 Current policy modifies this framework to permit 
IMF financing in cases involving greater uncertainty as to debt sustainability.207 
Under current policy, where a member’s debt is deemed sustainable but not with 
high probability, it can qualify for Fund support by conducting a debt reprofiling 
(i.e., deferring coupon and principal payments) rather than an outright restruc-
turing (i.e., reduction of outstanding principal).208 
Several things should be clear from this summary. First, IMF sustainability 
assessments are technical and involve both quantitative and qualitative assess-
ments of the member’s economic and political situation.209 As an example, low-
income countries not already having repayment difficulties are sorted into low, 
medium, and high risk categories depending on whether a series of debt burden 
indicators exceed defined thresholds in a baseline scenario and in “stress test” 
scenarios involving external shocks or macroeconomic policy shifts.210 Three in-
dicators examine the present value of the member’s outstanding debt as a per-
centage of its exports, GDP, and revenues.211 Two more examine debt service 
payments as a percentage of exports and revenues.212 For each indicator, the rel-
evant threshold varies depending on whether the member’s policies and institu-
tions fall into weak, medium, or strong categories.213 These categories are prox-
ies for whether the member has the political and economic capacity to tax or 
otherwise engage in the fiscal adjustment necessary to avoid balance of payment 
difficulties.214 
 
 203.  See, e.g., Sean Hagan, Designing a Legal Framework to Restructure Sovereign Debt, 36 GEO. J. INT’L 
L. 299, 330, 330 n.84 (2005); Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A Bankruptcy Reorganization 
Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 957 (1999). 
 204.  Hagan, supra note 203, at 300-31. 
 205.  See IMF, The Fund’s Lending Framework and Sovereign Debt—Further Considerations, supra note 
202, at 6–7. 
 206. Id. at 7. 
 207.  Id. at 9–10. 
 208.  Id. at 10. 
 209. Id. at 18. 
 210. IMF, The Joint World Bank-IMF Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries, Factsheet 
(Aug. 15, 2018), https://www.imf.org/en/About/Factsheets/Sheets/2016/08/01/16/39/Debt-Sustainability-Frame 
work-for-Low-Income-Countries. 
 211.  Id. 
 212.  Id. 
 213.  Id. These metrics are slightly modified when remittances are taken into account. See IMF, Staff Guid-
ance Note on the Application of the Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Framework for Low-Income Countries, 
Policy Paper, 10 (Nov. 5, 2013), https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/Policy-Papers/Issues/2016/12/31/Staff-
Guidance-Note-on-the-Application-of-the-Joint-Bank-Fund-Debt-Sustainability-Framework-PP4827. 
 214.  See IMF, Staff Guidance Note on the Application of the Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainability Frame-
work for Low-Income Countries, supra note 213, at 14. 
  
1622 UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2019 
A second important area to emphasize regarding IMF assessments of debt 
sustainability is that they are focused on the ability to avoid default. To be clear, 
in the context of the Exceptional Access Framework, the purpose of the IMF’s 
inquiry is to ensure that the Fund is repaid in full for any emergency access fi-
nancing.215 Yet, the assessment of sustainability does not otherwise ask whether 
the government can be expected to reduce its debt, nor does it explicitly consider 
the impact of the member’s debt on citizens or on the member’s ability to pursue 
development or other policy objectives.216 This is not because the IMF considers 
such matters unimportant. Instead, the Fund defers to members in the definition 
of policy objectives and spending priorities.217 The limited role of a debt sustain-
ability assessment is to determine whether the member is likely to be able to 
continue to pursue these without a politically or economically infeasible adjust-
ment to its primary balance.218 
Finally, IMF sustainability assessments occur largely ex post—that is, after 
the borrower has already incurred much debt. To be sure, these assessments are 
predictions of the likelihood of balance of payments difficulties in the future, and 
the IMF may condition its own lending on a finding of sustainability. Other lend-
ers, however, need not take assessments of debt sustainability by the IMF or any 
other entity into account when making loans.219 In consequence, IMF sustaina-
bility assessments tend to matter most when a government is already in financial 
crisis.220 By that point, the horse is out of the barn. 
This is not meant to be unduly critical of the IMF. As mentioned, the IMF 
seeks to perform a technical function, one as to which it can claim both expertise 
and relative legitimacy, while leaving governments room to set policy objec-
tives.221 Its practices are dwelled on because the IMF is the most prominent and 
well-established institutional mechanism for incorporating judgments as to debt 
sustainability into policy action in the context of sovereign lending.222 Because 
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of its prominent role, however, IMF assessments present some risk of crowding 
out other perspectives on how to define debt sustainability. 
The sustainability of a country’s debt need not be assessed in such a limited, 
ex post manner, however. It is not a given, for instance, that a country’s debt is 
“sustainable” simply because the country can remain current on its debts.223 At 
minimum, such a standard may enable debt restructurings that occur too late or 
that provide too little debt relief.224 Politicians in financially distressed countries 
have incentives to put off the day of reckoning.225 Because IMF sustainability 
determinations “have a decisive influence on the timing of sovereign debt re-
structuring,”226 a standard that is too easily satisfied may enable politicians to 
delay the inevitable. Moreover, a level of debt that impairs the ability to provide 
public services, pursue development objectives, or otherwise enhance citizen 
welfare could properly be called unsustainable, whether or not the government 
is expected to keep paying its debts for the foreseeable future. For some large 
governments, moreover, default may present systemic risks to the global finan-
cial system in the modern context.227 Perhaps assessments of debt sustainability 
should take such risks into account in determining the level of debt that is appro-
priate for a given borrower. 
Concerns like these have led some actors to push for a broader conception 
of debt sustainability. For instance, a 2015 United Nations General Assembly 
resolution on sovereign debt restructurings explicitly injects development and 
human rights objectives, as well as systemic concerns, into the definition: 
Sustainability implies . . . a stable debt situation in the debtor State, pre-
serving at the outset creditors’ rights while promoting sustained and inclu-
sive economic growth and sustainable development, minimizing economic 
and social costs, warranting the stability of the international financial sys-
tem and respecting human rights.228 
Civil society groups have also urged a broader conception of debt sustain-
ability, one that looks beyond macroeconomic indicators of debt servicing ca-
pacity and takes into account the borrower’s ability to foster human develop-
ment.229 More recently, Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky and Matthias Goldmann argued 
that debt sustainability is emerging as a principle of public international law, one 
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that includes “two important public interests, namely a concern for economic 
development and growth, and increasingly also for the protection of human 
rights.”230 Whether or not one accepts their claim about public international law, 
they correctly note that international actors have increasingly recognized the neg-
ative impact of high debt levels on the ability of governments to advance the 
welfare of citizens.231 
Even these exceptions, however, highlight the limits of current discourse 
about sovereign debt. Most notably, many of the voices arguing for a broader 
conception of debt sustainability are focused on the context of debt restructur-
ing.232 In the next Section, we accept this limitation—asking whether consumer 
finance offers any insight into how debt sustainability should be assessed in the 
ex post context of a debt crisis. We then shift focus, examining whether lessons 
from consumer debt can inform debates over the ex ante practices of lenders in 
sovereign debt markets. 
B. Debt Sustainability Parallels to Consumer Protection 
Our critique of the ex post orientation of sustainability analysis does not 
render this inquiry unnecessary. As noted, the IMF cannot justify extending 
emergency loans without assurance it will be repaid. In that narrow context, the 
Fund might properly focus its inquiry on the likelihood of default during the pe-
riod of an IMF program. Yet it should be obvious that this is not the goal of a 
debt restructuring. Broadly speaking, that goal is to return the government to 
financial health in a way that fairly allocates the costs of financial crisis among 
citizens, bondholders, and other competing claimants.233 As Anna Gelpern puts 
it: “The existing regime tends to approach debt sustainability as a fact, an ascer-
tainable threshold . . . . It is generally understood, but less commonly discussed, 
that sustainability is also a political judgment about distribution of resources be-
tween debtors and creditors.”234 
The question is how this judgment should be made. The task of defining 
debt sustainability involves both technical decisions (e.g., Which macroeco-
nomic and social indicators reliably indicate the presence or absence of sustain-
able debt?) and normative ones (e.g., What makes debt problematic, and what 
are the characteristic of an “appropriate” restructuring?). Analogous debates in 
consumer lending confirm the difficulty of resolving these questions, both be-
cause of technical complexity and because the need for normative judgments 
implies that technocratic assessments made at the international level should defer 
to national resolution of questions of social and cultural dimension. 
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On the technical front, the process of defining consumer over-indebtedness 
has been fraught with complication. If one goal of responsible lending regulation 
is to reduce over-indebtedness, policymakers would be aided in measuring the 
success of their proposals by converging on an agreed upon definition of the 
term. Instead, they struggle with definitions,235 disagreeing on when aggregate 
household debt levels become problematic enough to justify intervention. While 
recent research has converged to some degree on indicators of over-indebted-
ness, researchers still track as many as seven different indicators.236 
Despite the failure to agree on a single definition of consumer over-indebt-
edness, researchers seem to have converged on the principles or goals underlying 
such a definition.237 Policymakers agree that the definition must call for an as-
sessment of the effects of indebtedness after it was incurred.238 These effects 
transform a heavy debt burden into one that is problematic. Debt levels are 
viewed as problematic if the debtor suffers (i) difficulties in repayment (ii) that 
are more than temporary and (iii) that negatively affect long-term consumption 
decisions of the debtor and the debtor’s dependents.239 Importantly, (iv) debt is 
viewed as problematic not simply because of its effects on the consumer,240 but 
also because of negative externalities that impair the welfare of dependents and 
other third parties.241 
There is less agreement on normatively tinged questions involving when 
consumer debt shifts to problematic levels and how to respond when this hap-
pens. Although the notion of debt adjustment controverts foundational principles 
regarding the sanctity of contract, many would argue that these principles face 
normative limits.242 The latter contend that consumer borrowers should be al-
lowed to restructure or discharge debt that cannot be repaid over the long-term 
in order to fix problems of over-indebtedness, and support the case for restruc-
turing or discharge of unsustainable debt on a combination of pragmatic and 
principled notions.243 They argue that efforts to collect unsustainable debt in-
volve expensive and mostly unproductive “wheel spinning,” and also harm a 
consumer borrower’s will to work and health, as well as the borrower’s ability 
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to provide for dependents and participate as a functioning member of the eco-
nomic community.244 Among those willing to consider remedies of discharge, 
restructuring or rescission, there is also disagreement on when a consumer’s 
debts should be viewed as unlikely to be repaid over the long-term and what 
constitutes a sufficiently long period of time for such repayment efforts.245 
We would not expect greater consensus among policy actors in the sover-
eign debt world. But this does not mean reform is impossible. One possibility is 
to emphasize structural changes that do not require consensus on technical ques-
tions or normative policy objectives. Another is to agree at least on the breadth 
of the normative questions involved in assessing sovereign debt sustainability. 
As Bohoslavsky and Goldmann point out, policy actors increasingly 
acknowledge that the goal of a sovereign debt restructuring is to restore debt 
sustainability.246 
Although policy actors may define sustainability in different ways, they 
also seem to agree that the term means more than that the borrower’s primary 
balance is sufficient to “at least stabilize [its] debt.”247 Synthesizing sovereign 
debt practices as they have evolved since the 1970s, Bohoslavsky and Goldmann 
identify the emergence of a “public interest in debt practices that foster economic 
development and growth.”248 This developing consensus implies that a technical 
inquiry into the borrower’s ability to avoid default (akin to assessing “ability to 
pay” in the consumer context) is simply not adequate. 
If, given realistic (i.e., nonextreme) assumptions about future economic 
shocks, a country cannot remain current on its debt without adopting macroeco-
nomic policies that seriously compromise development objectives and citizen 
welfare, we do not think its debt can properly be called sustainable. Simple ref-
erence to the sanctity of contract does not end debate on whether sovereign debt 
judged unsustainable by this definition should be restructured. Insistence on re-
payment in such cases raises normative considerations that sit in tension with the 
principle that pacta sunt servanda.249 
If it is agreed that a finding of debt sustainability requires both technical 
and normative judgments, a number of implications follow. Some are structural. 
Put simply, the IMF is not the right institutional actor to assess debt sustainability 
in the broader sense we have described. On this basis, Anna Gelpern proposes 
that judgments about debt sustainability be made by “standing or ad hoc expert 
panels, drawn from agreed lists including market, civil society, and public sector 
representatives.”250 The IMF would continue to make sustainability assessments, 
of course, especially when assessing whether to lend to a financially-distressed 
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government.251 In that context, the technocratic nature of the Fund’s inquiry 
makes sense. But the IMF’s judgment would not necessarily be tied to broader 
questions about whether a government should restructure,252 or how to allocate 
a government’s limited resources among its various claimants. 
Though this proposal has a great deal of merit, there is also a danger in 
relying on structural solutions to problems with normative dimensions. The fact 
that sustainability assessments are unavoidably political does not mean that they 
are entirely political. Even if sustainability assessments are conducted by panels 
whose membership is more representative of the diverse interests in play in a 
debt restructuring,253 decision-makers would benefit from having a shared sense 
of why sustainability matters. 
The recent General Assembly Resolution on sovereign debt restructuring 
presents a useful shift in this regard, defining “sustainability” with respect to na-
tional objectives for economic development and more basic concerns for human 
rights.254 The Eurodad Responsible Finance Charter similarly emphasizes the hu-
man rights aspects of assessing the sustainability of sovereign debt.255 We would 
go a step further: Decision-makers assessing the sustainability (or unsustainabil-
ity) of sovereign debt, whether the IMF or some more inclusive panel of experts, 
should be cognizant of similar questions asked when considering how best to 
address consumer over-indebtedness. In the consumer debt context, despite lack 
of agreement on how to define or respond to over-indebtedness, there is relatively 
widespread agreement that negative externalities are part of what makes debt 
problematic.256 There is also agreement that, because over-indebtedness is prob-
lematic on multiple levels, consumer debt must sometimes be reduced even 
though this means that the consumer’s contracts will not be honored in full.257 
At a minimum, the parallels we raise suggest that debt sustainability judg-
ments in the sovereign debt context must consider more than whether the debtor 
can remain current in the medium-to-long term. Sovereign debt should be clas-
sified as unsustainable when it cannot be repaid in the reasonably-long-term 
without materially impairing the government’s ability to ensure citizen welfare 
and to pursue reasonable development goals. This is true whether or not the coun-
try can continue to “pay” (if not “repay”) its debt by meeting, but not reducing, 
debt obligations. Parallels to consumer debt also imply that, in the case of sys-
temically significant sovereign borrowers, efforts to delay or avoid restructuring 
can impose unwarranted costs that extend beyond the borrower’s citizens and 
lenders, and provide support for the notion that these externalities can justify 
limits on the sanctity of contract. 
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C. Assessing Lender Roles and Responsibilities Ex Ante 
Beyond informing ex post assessments of debt sustainability, experience 
from the consumer lending context can inform conversations about the roles and 
responsibilities private lenders should assume when making loans to sovereign 
borrowers. As noted, consumer and sovereign lending differ in important 
ways.258 Among many other differences, national regulators have demonstrated 
little desire to legislate standards of conduct with regard to the making of loans 
to foreign sovereigns. Yet these same regulators, sometimes working in tandem 
with international organizations like the IMF, have often wielded regulatory 
power more subtly by, for example, cajoling lenders into revising loan  
contracts.259 
As we have explained, the concept of lender responsibility has also gained 
currency through the efforts of civil society groups and intergovernmental or-
ganizations like UNCTAD and Eurodad.260 It is not implausible to think that, if 
articulated with sufficient clarity, notions of responsible lending might crystal-
lize into a set of norms or best practices that would mitigate some of the risks 
associated with excessive lending.261 But this cannot happen until the concept of 
responsible sovereign lending has been defined more concretely.262 Experience 
from the consumer context teaches not to expect consensus on precise standards 
of conduct. But in the sovereign debt context, the problem runs deeper. There 
remains no consensus on the goals of lending regulation—indeed, there is little 
explicit discussion of the topic. This must change. 
1. Goals and Methods of Consumer Lending Regulation 
In the consumer context, disagreements on how to remedy problems of 
over-indebtedness after they arise (ex post) parallel debates on how to prevent 
over-indebtedness in the first instance (ex ante). One debate is over regulatory 
goals. In the prevention context, this plays out as a debate over whether regula-
tion should focus only on problematic lending practices, or whether regulation 
should seek more broadly to assure that borrowers do not incur loans they cannot 
pay (or repay) or that do not suit their risk preferences. The former model is 
sometimes referred to as predatory lending regulation (or regulation of unfair, 
deceptive, and abusive lending practices); the latter is often referred to as respon-
sible lending regulation, although, as noted above, this term can also refer to 
almost any sort of lending regulation.263 
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Earlier, for instance, we described the lack of consensus as to whether con-
sumer lenders should assess a borrower’s “ability to pay” or “ability to repay” 
indebtedness.264 One way to view this disagreement is as a reflection of a lack of 
agreement on foundational principles. Responsible lending regulation of con-
sumer finance markets may be animated by the desire to address problems of 
over-indebtedness, the perception that many consumer lenders engage in preda-
tory practices, or by both concerns.265 
Given the lack of agreement about goals, it should be no surprise that reg-
ulators often disagree on the form of consumer lending regulation. Some view 
vague standards prohibiting, for example, unfair, deceptive, and abusive prac-
tices, or mandating responsible lending practices, as providing needed flexibility; 
others view clear-cut rules as the only effective way to provide guidance in this 
context.266 
Importantly, even when regulation opts for clear-cut rules, this choice may 
implicate questions analogous to those that preclude agreement on how to define 
over-indebtedness.267 The search for indicators of over-indebtedness looks to 
distinguish debt that is simply difficult to repay from debt that is unsustainable. 
A similar distinction is implicit in standards that look to a borrower’s “ability to 
pay” or repay, which often articulate debt-to-income or loan-to-value ratios that 
can serve as proxies for problematic loans. 
Over-indebtedness debates reveal the difficulty of identifying the time 
frame over which judgments about a borrower’s payment (or repayment) pro-
spects should be made and emphasize the importance of externality effects—on 
dependents, for example.268 And safe harbors demonstrating responsible lending 
may differ depending on whether the covered loan involves a long-term mort-
gage, short-term payday, or other personal loan. 269 Existing policy debates in 
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these two contexts also emphasize the distinct social welfare implications of con-
straining access to mortgage credit versus access to short-term fringe loans.270 
2. What are the Goals of Sovereign Lending Regulation? 
In sovereign debt markets, national regulators have shown little inclination 
to impose requirements on banks and financial intermediaries, but this lack of 
explicit lawmaking should not be confused with apathy. Regulators have often 
used arm-twisting and moral suasion to influence behavior. For example, the 
United States Treasury and other official sector actors have repeatedly launched 
initiatives to persuade market participants to revise sovereign bond contracts to 
facilitate debt restructuring.271 These efforts, paired with the fact that many coun-
tries do impose substantive obligations on commercial lenders in non-sovereign 
markets,272 imply that regulators have at least some willingness to translate the 
concept of lender responsibility into policy action. In a similar vein, groups like 
UNCTAD hope to shape lender behavior by identifying principles and practices 
that will “promote more responsible behavior.”273 
These initiatives, however, do not articulate a clear definition of responsi-
ble lending. For instance, the UNCTAD Principles at times appear to conflate 
concepts of responsible lending with notions of debt sustainability.274 As noted 
above, this raises a fundamental definitional problem, as there is nothing ap-
proaching consensus as to what makes debt unsustainable.275 The lack of agree-
ment on such basic questions can frustrate policy action or render it less coherent. 
Thus, the UNCTAD Principles appear to recognize that lenders have only a lim-
ited obligation to assess the borrower’s ability to maintain debt service (if not 
repay in full), 276 while simultaneously recognizing that excessive lending can 
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harm other creditors (e.g., through debt dilution)277 and that governments should 
not incur debt unless the “prospective social return” exceeds the cost of borrow-
ing.278 The Principles do not make clear how these underlying risks—of debt 
dilution and socially-unproductive borrowing—warrant such a limited concep-
tion of lender responsibility. 
We would not expect there to be greater consensus about how to regulate 
in the sovereign debt context than in the consumer context. But we do think de-
bates about responsible sovereign lending would benefit if participants more 
clearly articulated their regulatory goals. The most important question is this: 
Does responsible sovereign lending regulation aim to inhibit problematic or abu-
sive lending practices, to prevent governments from incurring unsustainable debt 
burdens, or both? 
As is clear from the consumer lending context, the answers have different 
regulatory implications. An emphasis on lender misbehavior naturally focuses 
attention on abusive practices or on the use of problematic clauses in loan con-
tracts. In consumer lending, regulation designed to address predatory lending 
typically presumes a consumer borrower’s harm, simplifying the inquiry to hone 
in on lender misconduct and contractual overreaching.279 By contrast, responsi-
ble lending regulation focused on forestalling over-indebtedness draws a broader 
net, problematizing all of the debt owed by an over-indebted consumer borrower 
regardless of the form or terms of the loan.280 Where regulation primarily seeks 
to address problems of over-indebtedness, the borrower’s debt burden shifts to 
each lender the burden of showing that the borrower had the “ability to pay” that 
loan and that it was a subsequent extension of credit that put the borrower into 
financial danger. 
Reform initiatives in sovereign debt markets sometimes appear to adopt a 
view of responsible sovereign lending that prioritizes problematic lender con-
duct. The United States Treasury’s repeated efforts to encourage bond market 
participants to embrace broad collective action clauses—which limit holdout 
creditor rights in a restructuring—is an example.281 So is the recent initiative by 
Treasury (supported by the IMF) to encourage governments to revise pari passu 
clauses—clauses in sovereign bonds terms that, as presently drafted, have been 
interpreted to allow debt restructuring holdouts to interfere with payments to 
creditors who agree to provide debt relief.282 Such efforts implicitly convey the 
message that problems in sovereign bond markets mostly result from undesirable 
lending practices, such as the use of sub-optimal bond contracts. But these initi-
atives do not follow from any clear—or even publicly acknowledged—regula-
tory objectives. 
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Clearer articulation of these objectives might enable more coherent policy 
action, or at least permit debate about the proper scope of intervention. For in-
stance, if preventing lenders from including abusive contract terms is an explicit 
regulatory goal, there is no reason to limit consideration only to esoteric contract 
terms, or to rely on moral suasion as a regulatory tactic. Although sovereign bor-
rowers cannot be directly regulated, this is not true of the financial institutions 
that make or facilitate sovereign loans.283 
By contrast, if responsible sovereign lending initiatives aim to prevent 
over-borrowing (and over-lending) more generally, rather than just the worst 
lending practices, different regulatory tools and challenges come to the fore. It 
may be unreasonable to expect every lender holistically to assess the sustainabil-
ity of a government’s debt before making a loan. Yet if it is reasonable to think 
standing panels might opine on debt sustainability in the restructuring context, 
there is also reason to think such panels could make sustainability judgments on 
an ongoing basis.284 Over time, perhaps, a consensus might evolve that lender 
best practices include giving explicit consideration to the judgments of such a 
panel before making a loan. But without explicit discussion of why responsible 
lending regulation matters, it will be hard to have meaningful debate over the 
merits of any regulatory strategy. 
Another important consideration is the need for ex ante certainty about reg-
ulatory compliance and loan enforceability. Certainty requires either clear stand-
ards or clear procedures that lenders must follow (to get safe harbor). Experience 
with consumer financial regulation suggests that definitional debates may plague 
the search for cohesive regulatory standards. This is because even clear-cut rules 
may refer to the same issues as preclude agreement on core definitional ques-
tions. For example, the attempt to identify indicators of over-indebtedness strives 
to distinguish between debt that is difficult to repay and debt that is unsustaina-
ble.285 Likewise, “ability to pay” or repay standards look to articulate debt-to-
income or loan-to-value ratios that inferentially get at the same distinction.286 
Similarly, over-indebtedness debates struggle to articulate the time horizons 
likely to signal actual problems in debt repayment versus difficulties in debt  
repayment and emphasize the importance of externalities—on dependents, for 
example.287 
Nevertheless, consumer lending regulation offers some insight into the 
kinds of trade-offs that may be necessary to achieve ex ante certainty. For in-
stance, the open-ended “ability to repay” standard applicable to mortgage lend-
ing—and potentially applicable to payday and other small amount, short term 
lending—is coupled with “safe harbor” provisions to clarify when a lender has 
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satisfied these more open-ended standards.288 These safe harbor provisions pro-
vide clear guideposts for assessing the affordability of the payday loan or resi-
dential mortgage (for example, by means of a debt-to-income ratio) and clear 
rules identifying problematic contract terms (such as, balloon payment obliga-
tions in the case of residential mortgages or security rights in the borrower’s mo-
tor vehicle). By contrast, no explicit “safe harbor” clarifies the “ability to pay” 
requirement in credit card markets.289 The explanation for this lack of parallelism 
is hard to fathom. 
In the context of sovereign lending, certainty benefits both lenders and bor-
rowers. Yet a vague concept of “responsible lending” cannot provide certainty, 
especially when enforced ex post in the context of litigation. For instance, Boho-
slavsky and Goldmann suggest that courts might interpret and enforce sovereign 
debt contracts with regard to background principles of “responsible lending.”290 
As a descriptive matter, we agree with the point. But if courts were to deny en-
forcement to debt contracts based on an ex post finding that a lender has acted 
“irresponsibly,” this would risk unsettling debt markets and needlessly increas-
ing the cost of sovereign credit.291 An explicit discussion of regulatory goals, 
combined with an acknowledgement of the importance of ex ante certainty about 
regulatory compliance, would permit a more fruitful discussion of how to regu-
late sovereign lending. Whether in the form of obligatory standards of conduct 
imposed by national regulators, or consensus best practices agreed upon by mar-
ket participants, regulation will require trade-offs, and these cannot be made in a 
sensible manner without clearly articulated regulatory objectives. 
3. A Word on Implementation 
Global financial markets pose a regulatory challenge, as “mobile market 
participants and capital more easily escape unilateral national regulatory super-
vision.”292 But this does not mean that there are no regulatory tools. To begin, 
regulators have power to dictate standards of conduct for market participants 
subject to their jurisdiction; especially when issued by regulators in important 
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capital markets, regulation of this sort also may influence conduct elsewhere.293 
Yet the utility of such regulation is limited by the ability of market participants 
to migrate to other capital markets and other factors.294 In sovereign debt mar-
kets, the challenge is exacerbated by the fact that borrowers are largely immune 
to coercive regulation. 
The result is that formal domestic and international law play a limited role 
in these markets. Instead, regulation is informal and fragmented, consisting 
largely of norms and practices that have emerged from the work of important 
players in the world of sovereign debt. These players include international or-
ganizations like the IMF as well as informal networks of official creditors (such 
as the Paris Club) and private market participants (such as the International Cap-
ital Markets Association).295 
Even understood as soft law, regulation to promote responsible lending in 
sovereign debt markets requires—for the reasons we have explained—greater 
consensus about regulatory objectives and, ultimately, definitional clarity.296 
This will necessitate efforts to induce important stakeholders to endorse and elab-
orate on the general principle of lender responsibility,  as well as efforts to de-
velop agreed mechanisms to monitor compliance.297 There are already models of 
such coordination with regard to lending practices in sovereign debt markets, 
although their impact remains uncertain.298 Although existing coordination initi-
atives have not prioritized the development of coherent standards for responsible 
lending, there is no reason they could not do so. 
Nor is there reason to doubt the ability of banks and other financial inter-
mediaries to comply with clearly articulated responsible lending standards. Some 
proposals to remedy problems in sovereign debt markets require lenders to make 
difficult, normatively tinged judgments. For example, proponents of the “odious 
debt” doctrine urge that successor governments should not be responsible for 
debts (i) incurred by a prior despotic or authoritarian regime, (ii) used to benefit 
political officials or for illegitimate purposes like genocide, when (iii) lenders 
knew the funds would be used for such purposes.299 The problem with such pro-
posals—in addition to the dubious legal status of the doctrine—is that lenders 
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cannot easily identify the intended purpose of a loan, much less make the nor-
matively tinged judgment about whether a regime is sufficiently authoritarian to 
place its debts in question.300 
Our proposal need not raise such concerns, as our primary expectation is 
that responsible lending standards will insist that lenders make risk assessments, 
typical of sound underwriting practices, at the time a loan is extended. This does 
not mean that lenders can perfectly assess a sovereign borrower’s “ability to pay” 
(or repay). “[S]olvency is intrinsically an intertemporal concept,”301 requiring 
predictive judgments whose accuracy will depend on subsequent economic and 
political developments. No one can claim it is illegitimate, however, to expect 
banks to make good-faith, rigorous risk assessments, nor complain that banks 
and other financial institutions lack the capacity to make reasonably informed 
judgments about repayment capacity. 
More broadly, we have also called for a broader definition of debt sustain-
ability: one that considers the impact of debt on a sovereign’s ability to pursue 
development objectives and otherwise promote citizen welfare.302 As we have 
explained, this call for an expanded definition of sustainability has structural im-
plications, most notably—and echoing Anna Gelpern—that the IMF is not the 
right institution to make such judgments. 303 
We add that there are historical parallels for such proposals. For example, 
the Committee for the Study of International Loan Contracts, convened by the 
League of Nations in 1935, proposed an independent “body of recognized finan-
cial experts,” available at the request of issuing governments to opine on “the 
economic limits within which it would be wise to raise loans for a given borrow-
ing country.”304 The report hinted that such a body could mitigate incentives for 
“excessive and uncoordinated lending.”305 The proposal was not implemented, 
among other reasons, because the Great Depression and ensuing war effectively 
shut down sovereign debt markets for decades. Yet the insight remains valid. 
Even in connection with technical underwriting judgments, independent assess-
ments of “ability to pay” (or repay) might partially offset the perverse lender 
incentives described earlier.306 And especially on broader questions of debt sus-
tainability, independent, broadly-representative bodies can more appropriately 
make normatively tinged judgments about when debt has become problematic. 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
We began this Article by questioning the conventional view that the prob-
lems of sovereign debt result from the attributes of sovereignty. To be sure, that 
view has some merit. But the fact that sovereigns are unique borrowers does not 
mean that lenders and other financial intermediaries in sovereign debt markets 
differ from counterparts in other markets. Because governments cannot borrow 
if lenders will not lend, the fact of widespread over-indebtedness implies a need 
to examine more closely the behavior and incentives of lenders when making or 
arranging loans. Lending is often characterized by agency problems, excessive 
optimism, and other incentives for excessive lending. These commonalities sug-
gest that academic and policy debates about sovereign debt context should pay 
more attention to the roles and responsibilities of lenders. But given the scant 
attention paid to such questions thus far, where should the discussion begin? 
In our view, the answer lies not—or not exclusively—in the corporate debt 
metaphor. There are important parallels between sovereign debt and consumer 
debt. In contrast to corporate lending, where entity protections mean that all lend-
ing is asset-based, lending in sovereign and consumer markets is income-based. 
Lenders decide whether to lend (and whether to restructure) based primarily on 
an assessment ability and willingness to pay. And lenders in both markets have 
similar incentives toward over-lending. 
The consumer metaphor highlights gaps in the debate over how to reform 
sovereign debt markets and offers insight into how to begin filling them. Even if 
regulatory interventions targeting sovereign lending cannot solve the problems 
associated with sovereign debt, they might mitigate some of the worst excesses. 
Ex post assessments of debt sustainability are not adequate, not because they are 
technically flawed, but because they do not recognize that over-indebtedness is 
problematic on multiple levels, not least because excessive debt can impair a 
government’s ability to ensure citizen welfare. In the consumer context, there is 
no consensus on precisely how to measure the related concept of over-indebted-
ness, but there is widespread agreement that negative externalities are part of 
what makes this debt problematic. 
The consumer lending context also makes clear that there must be more 
explicit discussion about how to define lender roles and responsibilities in sov-
ereign debt markets. It may be too much to expect consensus about specific reg-
ulatory goals and methods. Even in the consumer context, this type of agreement 
has been elusive. But in the sovereign debt context, fundamental questions re-
main not only unanswered, but largely unasked. Reform initiatives cannot pro-
ceed in a coherent fashion without explicit discussion of regulatory goals. 
 
